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I. INTRODUCTION1 
The primary purpose of this article is to identify, analyze and decipher 
the multifarious challenges of instituting fully independent boards of 
directors in family-run2 companies, as well as to prescribe 
recommendations for these challenges.  As more family businesses are 
established in North America, Asia, and other parts of the world, and as 
existing family-controlled enterprises are continuously being run and 
fortified by enterprising families, there is a constant rethinking on their 
business governance structure.  Since a great majority of family businesses 
do not last beyond the first or second generation if not governed 
responsibly, the ultimate question is whether or not strategically placing 
independent directors will help empower these close corporations to last 
 
 * LL.M. (University of Pennsylvania Law School, 2008); Certificate in Business and 
Public Policy (Wharton School, 2008); LL.M. in International Economic and Business Law 
(Kyushu University Faculty of Law, Japan, 2006); J.D./Bachelor of Laws (University of the 
Philippines, 2002). 
 1. I express my great appreciation to my Wharton professor on Strategies and 
Practices of Family-controlled Companies, Prof. William Alexander, for providing useful 
insights and academic guidance during the development of this paper.  I also sincerely thank 
Mr. Philip Clemens, Chairman and CEO of The Clemens Family Corporation and Hatfield 
Quality Meats, for sharing his time and practical wisdom on the independent board of his 
family company. 
 2. “Family-run,” “family-controlled” and “family business” will be used 
interchangeably throughout the article. A family-run business is “typically one in which 
more than half the shares are controlled by members of the same family, or one that has 
been passed between generations.”  Business Link, Family-Run Businesses, 
http://www.businesslink.gov.uk/bdotg/action/layer?topicId=1074039321 (last visited Apr. 
22, 2008).  Family businesses can also be described as “organizations where two or more 
extended family members influence the direction of the business through the exercise of 
kinship ties, management roles, or ownership rights.”  Renato Tagiuri, Working With 
Relatives in the Family Firm, HARV. BUS. SCH. Note 9-902-424, Feb. 2002, at 1. 
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beyond their expected lifecycles. 
One of the basic questions that typically arise relates to whether there 
is a need for a board of directors to be established as the main governance 
structure.  This question is premised on the ominous fact that family-
controlled businesses3 have restricted shares, have no open market for stock 
transfers, and may not necessarily be as large as publicly-held companies 
(with exceptions, of course).  If there is a need for a board of directors, 
when should it be established in the history of the entity?  Once instituted, 
who will populate the board of directors and why?  Should all the seats in 
the board be occupied by the same family owners or should independent 
directors take their seats?  Why should independent directors take the seats 
of family members who have run and developed the company for decades?  
What are the critical functions of independent directors and what do they 
bring to the table?  Lastly, what should be the board’s recommended 
composition (i.e., the configuration between insider and independent 
directors), the length of their terms of office, the number of boards (both 
family-run and publicly-held corporations) they can adequately serve on 
without sacrificing quality and dedication to work, the background of these 
independent directors, and compensation?  Moreover, Dyer asks, “What 
should be the role and function of the board—rubberstamp, advisory, 
paper, or overseer?”4 
Also known as close corporations,5 family-run enterprises have been 
the backbone of industrial development in highly developed countries for a 
long period of time.  From simple sole proprietorships and “mom-and-pop 
shops,”6 to the United States’ 33 of the world’s 100 largest family 
businesses,7 the United Kingdom’s centuries-old royal companies,8 
 
 3. Family-controlled businesses are described as “businesses, whether public or 
private, in which a family controls the largest block of shares or votes and has one or more 
of its members in key management positions.”  DANNY MILLER & ISABEL LE BRETON-
MILLER, MANAGING FOR THE LONG RUN:  LESSONS IN COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE FROM 
GREAT FAMILY BUSINESSES 2 (2005). 
 4. W. GIBB DYER, JR., CULTURAL CHANGE IN FAMILY FIRMS: ANTICIPATING AND 
MANAGING BUSINESS AND FAMILY TRANSITIONS 67 (1986). 
 5. A close corporation cannot exceed thirty shareholders and is eligible to elect “S” 
Corporation status with the IRS.  The stockholder has limited disposition of the shares.  
Close corporations cannot also make public offerings as defined in the Securities Act of 
1933.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 342 (2008). 
 6. DAVID S. LANDES, DYNASTIES: FORTUNES AND MISFORTUNES OF THE WORLD’S 
GREAT FAMILY BUSINESSES xi (2006). 
 7. Jane A. Pearl and Leah Kristie, The World’s Largest Family Businesses:  
Spotlighting the Wealthiest of the Wealthy, FAM. BUS. MAG. 
http://familybusinessmagazine.com/WorldsLargestFBs.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2009). 
 8. See Leah Kristie, The World’s Oldest Family Companies:  Cheers to the Survivors, 
FAM. BUS. MAG. http://familybusinessmagazine.com/worldsoldest.html (last visited Oct. 4, 
2009) (noting that family businesses have been suppliers of military fabrics for British 
troops, builders of royal palaces and residences, clothing retailers and tailors, shipping 
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Germany’s family-owned and run small- and medium-sized businesses 
known as Mittelstand companies,9 Japan’s family-dominated pre-war 
zaibatsu conglomerates,10 and Korea’s family-controlled, government-
assisted corporate umbrella organizations known as chaebol,11 family 
businesses have served as the ultimate engines of growth and pushed world 
economies to where they have never been before.  Family-owned and run 
companies constitute “a bedrock of commercial activity and creativity”12 in 
every country in the world.  Sadly, despite their integral and incomparable 
contributions to fueling economies and creating wealth in the world, some 
family businesses have earned the negative reputation of being severely 
dominated by a family patriarch or matriarch, his or her children or heirs.  
These dominating figures are often resistant to change, adamantly refuse to 
listen to outside advice, are unfriendly to independent directors, and 
establish boards filled with insider and grey directors.  Numerous studies 
have been conducted on why controlling family members behave this way. 
In the last twenty or so years, spurred not only by the need to mimic 
the move to independent boards by publicly-held institutions,13 but also 
because of the valuable direction and monitoring provided by independent 
directors, family-controlled companies have been slowly shifting strategies 
by adding more independent members to their boards.  The globalized 
business environment has also encouraged family firms to explore this 
option.  Some companies have maintained an almost equal number of 
insiders and independents on the board.  Others have gone to the extent of 
placing a clear supermajority of independent directors on the board.  It is 
becoming the prevalent view that independent directors and independent 
boards help ease and minimize the problems normally associated with 
family-run businesses. 
 
agents, pottery makers, spinners, bankers, military uniform suppliers, and the like). 
 9. During the May 2008 Berkshire Hathaway annual shareholders’ meeting, Warren 
Buffet announced that his company is interested in acquiring German family-run and owned 
businesses to establish its presence in Europe.  Alistair Barr, Berkshire Eyes German 
Family-owned Businesses, MARKETWATCH, May 3, 2008, 
http://www.marketwatch.com/story/berkshire-eyes-german-family-owned-businesses. 
 10. See Haruhito Takeda, Corporate Governance in the Inter-War Zaibatsu, in THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN JAPAN AND BRITAIN 59, 62-63 (Robert 
Fitzgerald & Etsuo Abe eds., 2004) (“The principle of ownership was based on investment 
exclusivity, the limiting of investors to the same family, and the tendency to exclude 
potential sources of capital from outside the family.”).  Zaibatsu conglomerates were cartel-
driven, tightly held companies that were structured as large holding companies.  They 
typically supplied government requirements.  Id. 
 11. Thayer Watkins, Chaebol of South Korea, 
http://www.sjsu.edu/faculty/watkins/chaebol.htm (last visited April 30, 2008). 
 12. Richard M. Clarke, Family Dynamics and Board Duties:  A Delicate Balance, FAM. 
BUS. MAG., Winter 2007, at 1. 
 13. Guido Corbetta & Carlo A. Salvato, The Board of Directors in Family Firms: One 
Size Fits All?, 17 FAM. BUS. REV. 119, 119-20 (June 2004). 
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This paper seeks to provide an analysis and synthesis of the issues, 
challenges, and resolutions facing family companies with regard to 
independent boards.  It cites the strong advantages of purposefully placing 
highly competent independent directors as overseers, guides, analysts, 
monitoring agents, change catalysts, mentors, stewards, and sounding 
boards to and of the CEO, the successor, and other family members 
actively participating in running the business.  The time has arrived when 
the patriarch or matriarch no longer holds the business together all by 
himself or herself,14 or even with the aid of a responsible son or a daughter.  
Individual or sole leadership has had its day and its time has passed.  
Independent directors, as the new stewards, help steer the hands of these 
once ultra powerful individuals and families towards a better, more 
defined, socially responsible, genuinely empowered, and ethically 
governed stewardship of the family business in the hopes that it shall 
survive and thrive beyond a hundred or more years of creditable 
existence.15 
II. THE FAMILY BUSINESS CONTEXT 
There are plenty of reasons why families go into business.  For some, 
entrepreneurship is something coincidental, accidental, and unintended, 
leading to financial success and consistent business growth years later.  
Others have started a business to create a challenge after retirement, to 
augment a meager family income, to avoid starvation and poverty,16 to 
support siblings, or for “meeting the needs.”17  Some continue on the 
legacies of past generations by growing existing businesses.  There are also 
individuals who craved for financial stability as a result of immigration and 
turned to business as their way to achieve this goal.18  It has likewise served 
as an avenue of self-expression and self-enterprise.  Donald Trump 
jumpstarted his career in his family’s real estate business in New York after 
studying at the Wharton Business School.  Charles Henry Dow, Edward 
Davis Jones, and Charles Milford Bergstresser started Dow Jones & Co. in 
 
 14. See ELFREN SICANGCO CRUZ, SETTING FRAMEWORKS: FAMILY BUSINESS AND 
STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT 75 (2005) (noting the need for family businesses to institute a 
board of directors in order to become globally competitive). 
 15. This is in contrast to the short life span which characterizes many family-run 
businesses.  See generally JOHN L. WARD, KEEPING THE FAMILY BUSINESS HEALTHY (1987) 
(analyzing the challenges of maintaining the long-term health of a family-run business). 
 16. Gordon Brannan, Bhiwar Enterprises, Richard Ivey School of Business, The 
University of Western Ontario 9A86C051, Feb. 2007, at 1. 
 17. Michael J. Roberts, Sam Steinberg (A) and (B) (Condensed), HARV. BUS. SCH. 
Note. 9-392-044, Mar. 1993, at 3-4. 
 18. Alexis Gendron, Iggy’s Bread of the World, HARV. BUS. SCH. Note 9-801-282, Mar. 
2001, at 2-8. 
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a small basement office in New York in 1882 to help Wall Street analyze 
the rise and fall of securities, setting the stage for Hugh Bancroft to become 
Dow Jones president in 1928 (and creating a family empire in the 
process).19  Warren Buffet started off by working at the investment 
company Graham-Newman, and after gaining some experience, he went 
back to Omaha and began a limited investing fund partnership with a group 
of friends, family, and associates called the Buffett Partnerships Ltd.--the 
staging ground for his highly successful Berkshire Hathaway.20  These are 
immensely entrepreneurial people who started small with self-run family 
businesses that later graduated into large conglomerates.  The short end of 
it is that there are a variety of reasons why people start family businesses.  
In fact, some first generation entrepreneurs may totally be unaware that 
they are building the foundations of multinational business organizations. 
There are two theories commonly applied to corporate entities in 
general.  The Agency theory espouses the view that, in the context of a 
board, directors are seen as agents and managers of the institution whose 
vital task is to protect the interests of only the shareholders as residual 
owners of the company.21  They monitor the CEO and the implementation 
of corporate strategies, determine the level of CEO pay, plan for company 
succession,22 and provide overarching supervision.  These activities and 
functions allow the directors to ensure that officers are performing their 
roles in alignment with the interests of the shareholders. 
In contrast to the Agency theory, the Stewardship theory is keenly 
interested in ascertaining that the directors’ interests and motivations are 
aligned with the goals and objectives of the organization as a whole.  This 
means that the steward’s interest is aligned with the stakeholders’.  Under 
this theory, the “board’s primary role is to service and advise, rather than to 
 
 19. Dow Jones and the Wall Street Journal are now securely owned by Rupert Murdoch 
after an emotional tug of war between Murdoch and the Bancroft family.  See Joe Nocera, A 
Family’s Benign Neglect at Dow Jones, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2007, 
http://select.nytimes.com/2007/08/04/business/ 
04nocera.html?scp=1&sq=how+the+bancrofts+blew+it&st=nyt (reporting Murdoch’s 
takeover of the Wall Street Journal from the Bancroft family). 
 20. See Wall Street Week with Fortune, ‘The Best Advice I Ever Got’: Warren Buffett, 
Mar. 7, 2005, http://www.pbs.org/wsw/news/fortunearticle_20050307_01.html (last visited 
on April 23, 2008) (chronicling Buffett’s rise to prominence).  See also Woopidoo! 
Biographies, Warren Edward Buffett Biography, http://www.woopidoo.com/ 
biography/warren_buffett.htm (last visited on April 23, 2008) (providing a concise 
biography of Warren Buffett). 
 21. See generally Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and 
Control, 26 J. L. & ECON. 301 (1983) (analyzing the results of the separation of decision-
making and risk-bearing functions within business structures). 
 22. See Barbara Spector, Mike Henningsen’s Bright Idea, FAM. BUS. MAG., Winter 
2003, at 1177-80 (noting that non-family boards of directors ensure objectivity in succession 
planning). 
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discipline and monitor, as agency theory prescribes.”23  Stewardship as a 
model emphasizes:  (a) values of service over self-interest; (b) 
responsibility by prioritizing long-term gains and values over short-term, 
myopic greed; (c) and develops good governance, clear working processes, 
open communications, and encompassing empowerment.24  Collectivist and 
stakeholder-oriented, stewardship fittingly applies to the family business 
model setting. 
Some scholars25 suggest that a board dominated by insiders or 
company-affiliated directors (also known as “grey directors”) is a correct 
match for a company practicing stewardship.  This is not always the case, 
however, and this view may be losing its advocates.  More and more, 
family-run businesses, big and small, are revamping their board of directors 
by putting more independents than insiders or grey directors on their 
boards.  A majority of family businesses should in fact welcome 
independent directors into the boardroom.  This is part of the service and 
advisory functions of stewardship.  Transparent processes, good 
governance, and an empowering atmosphere are the general results of 
placing independents in a board. 
A. Pros and Cons of a Family-run Business 
A family business is a natural subset of a close corporation, which is 
typified by a small number of stockholders, no ready market for the shares, 
owner-management, and substantial participation by the majority 
stockholder in the management and operations of the corporation.26  It is 
similar to a partnership since “stockholders of a close corporation occupy a 
position similar to that of joint adventurers and partners . . . . [T]he 
practical realities of the organization and functioning of a small ‘two-man’ 
corporation . . . [is] to carry on a small business enterprise in which the 
stockholders, directors, and managers are the same persons.”27 
Family-controlled corporations provide an innate synergy between 
parents, siblings, and intergenerational kin in helping and assisting each 
other run the affairs of the business.  Since they are husbands and wives, 
brothers and sisters, uncles and nieces, grandparents and kin, there is an 
 
 23. Corbetta & Salvato, supra note 13, at 123. 
 24. William Alexander, Presentation on Stewardship at Wharton School’s Course on 
Strategies and Practices of Family-Controlled Companies (Jan. 22, 2008) (on file with 
author). 
 25. See C. Sundaramurthy & M. Lewis, Control and Collaboration: Paradoxes of 
Governance, 28 ACAD. OF MGMT. REV. 397, 409 (2003) (”[I]nsiders . . . provide a rich 
knowledge of and strong commitment to the firm.”). 
 26. See Galler v. Galler, 203 N.E.2d 577, 583-85 (Ill. 1964) (listing the attributes of a 
closed corporation). 
 27. Helms v. Duckworth, 249 F.2d 482, 486 (D.C. Cir. 1957). 
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expected familial bond that potentially lays the foundation of good business 
governance and smooth interpersonal communication.  Family businesses 
are good for openly communicating and mutually coordinating families.28  
If contrasted to a publicly-held corporation, family-run businesses or close 
corporations provide distinct advantages to shareholders, such as familiness 
and an easier vehicle for stewardship.  Other advantages include trust29 and 
mutuality of interests. 
However, as stated earlier, there are also several disadvantages to 
family-run businesses.  First, due to the closed and insular nature of the 
business, there is great opportunity for the majority shareholder to oppress 
minority shareholders, such as an older brother lording over a company to 
the detriment of a younger brother and his family who own fewer shares.30  
Similarly, rightful dividends may be withheld (refusal to declare), corporate 
earnings may be siphoned off, exorbitant salaries may be paid to the 
majority shareholder or his favored kin, or employment to a competent son 
or daughter of a minority shareholder may be unjustifiably refused.31  
Second, these entities create opportunities for “freeze-outs”32 and squeeze-
outs, two “draconian”33 terms that imply oppressive, coercive, and 
preclusive tactics and devices used by the majority owners to force the 
minority owners out of the business.34  Third, as a result of major 
disagreements, ego, pride, jealousy,35 or simple lack of trust,36 problems at 
home are brought into the workplace, resulting, for example, in a minority 
owner sibling being arbitrarily terminated (dismissed without cause) by a 
 
 28. See generally Johanna M. Hurstak & Jennifer Raiser, Salvatore Ferragamo, SpA, 
11 FAM. BUS. REV. 145, 145-63 (June 1998) (illustrating the benefits of family business). 
 29. See generally Robert Galford & Anne Seibold Drapeau, The Enemies of Trust, 
HARV. BUS. REV., Feb. 2003, at 88-95 (arguing that the productivity of a business 
organization is directly correlated to the level of trust within that organization). 
 30. John S. Powell, Your Risks as a Board Member, FAM. BUS. MAG., Autumn 1993, at 
1-2. 
 31. MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 329 (9th ed. 2005).  See Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New 
England, Inc., 328 N.E.2d 505, 517-19 (Mass. 1975) (holding for an increased duty of 
loyalty in the close corporation context due to the asymmetric distribution of power among 
majority and minority stockholders). 
 32. See Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 662 (Mass. 1976) 
(explaining that one feature of close corporations is the ability of majority stockholders to 
oppress, disadvantage or “freeze out” minority stockholders). 
 33. See Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1388 (Del. 1995) (declaring 
supermajority voting provisions, shareholder rights plans and the ilk “draconian” because of 
their use in protecting the corporation from perceived threats). 
 34. See id. (citing advance notice by-laws, supermajority voting provisions, shareholder 
rights plans and repurchase programs as examples of “draconian” tactics). 
 35. See WARD, supra note 15, at 3 (stating that many family businesses find family 
relations and infighting to be a stumbling block). 
 36. John L. Davis & Kacie LaChapelle, J. Perez Foods (A), HARV. BUS. SCH. Note 9-
801-147, Mar. 2001, at 1-12. 
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dominant, older sibling.37  Fourth, old wounds related to past family 
bickering tend to surface and take precedence when running family-based 
organizations.38  Fifth, and more importantly, business patriarchs or 
founders, overwhelmed by egotism and fueled by their need to stay in 
power for fear of reaching the point of needlessness,39 may unwittingly or 
intentionally restrain the growth of the next-in-line by failing to listen to 
advice, dismissing the next generation’s suggestions, failing to collaborate, 
and disregarding their own weaknesses.40  Sixth, family members, as 
jugglers of various corporate hats (owner, shareholder, manager, director, 
family office holders, and others), have immense conflicts of interest and a 
lack of transparency that may indirectly subject the business to the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act.41  Other negatives are the often emotional bases of 
leadership and work ethos,42 the prevalence of informality, incessant 
feelings of undervaluation by the family as sources of conflict,43 the 
always-in-the-shadow-of-dad sentiment,44 centralized decision-making 
processes, and the occasional lack of correlation between business skills 
 
 37. See Merola v. Exergen Corp., 668 N.E.2d 351, 355 (Mass. 1996) (noting that 
despite the possible specter of illegally discharging minority owner-managers, “[n]ot every 
discharge of an at-will employee of a close corporation who happens to own stock in the 
corporation gives rise to a successful breach of fiduciary duty claim.  The plaintiff was 
terminated in accordance with his employment contract and fairly compensated for his 
stock.  He failed to establish a sufficient basis for a breach of fiduciary duty claim . . . .”). 
 38. When running a family business, it is often very difficult to separate family affairs 
and pure business activities.  Normally, family biases, prejudices, infighting, and past 
conflicts tend to consistently surface, typically overshadowing business-only matters. 
 39. William Alexander, Lecturer, Presentation on The Outgoing Generation at Wharton 
School’s Course on Strategies and Practices of Family-Controlled Companies (Apr. 22, 
2008) (on file with author). 
 40. See DYER, supra note 4, at 59-61 (analyzing the importance and possible 
shortcomings of the founder in developing firm culture). 
 41. See François de Visscher, Board Members Beware:  Ethics Issues Abound, FAM. 
BUS. MAG., Winter 2005, at 2-3 (explaining the need for family companies to 
professionalize in the face of sweeping reforms instituted under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act).  
See also Matthew K. Donovan, Are You Ready for Corporate Reform?, FAM. BUS. MAG., 
Spring 2003, at 1-3 (arguing that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has serious implications for 
private family-owned businesses). 
 42. There are family businesses where the founder or founding owner believes that he 
alone can lead the company, and if reforms are necessary, only he can conceptualize and 
implement them.  Emotionally, this bullheaded founder/leader seldom has trust in other 
people, whether they are non-family managers or his own kin.  In some cases, a son or the 
eldest child of the founder is appointed as successor not because of abilities, education or 
experience, but purely because of blood ties. 
 43. See DENNIS T. JAFFE, WORKING WITH THE ONES YOU LOVE 88-91, (Conari Press 
1990) (analyzing common sources of interpersonal conflict within a family business). 
 44. See Peter Grant, Family Divide: At Cablevision, Father-Son Split Looms Over 
Future, WALL ST. J., Jan. 24, 2005, at A1 (discussing the difficulties faced by Cablevision 
CEO James Dolan in escaping the shadow of his father, the company’s founder). 
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and power conferment (nepotism).45 
B. Contrast to Publicly-Held Corporations: Market Model vs. Control 
Model 
Family businesses differ from publicly-held corporations in their chain 
of command.46  The latter are typically composed of thousands of 
diversified shareholders who do not know each other, have no participation 
in the business except owning the shares and reaping dividends, and have 
no familial ties to each other or to the leaders of the business.47  Publicly-
held companies also have corporate officers appointed by the board of 
directors, who themselves are selected by the shareholders during annual 
shareholders’ meetings.48  Currently, a typical public company’s board is 
composed of approximately ten members, 90% of whom are often 
independent directors, while the remaining insider is the CEO.49  
Conversely, family businesses generally are controlled primarily by family 
members, their boards of directors are often composed of blood kin with a 
sprinkling of independents, and their shareholders are often under-
diversified, consisting mostly of relatives.50  There are exceptions to this 
rule, as there are very large family corporations in the United States that 
would rival any publicly-held company.51  Family firms are business 
groups that have three levels of command—the owners, the board of 
directors, and the firm’s top management—often consisting of the same 
 
 45. See Craig E. Aronoff & John L. Ward, Rules for Nepotism, NATION’S BUSINESS, 
Jan. 1993, at 64 (arguing that family members should be required to meet certain objective 
qualifications before being invited to join the family firm). 
 46. See Corbetta & Salvato, supra note 13, at 123 (discussing the distinct theoretical 
perspectives to understand the characteristics of boards of directors). 
 47. ROBERT D. MCCRIE, SECURITY OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT 18 (2nd ed., Butterworth 
Heinemann, 2006). 
 48. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 141-142 (2004). 
 49. See Martin Lipton & Jay W. Lorsch, A Modest Proposal For Improved Corporate 
Governance, 48 BUS. LAW. 59, 67 (1992) (arguing that corporate boards should be limited to 
ten members).  See also Roger Raber, National Association of Corporate Directors’ 
President and CEO, Corporate Governance in the Global Economy: Roles and 
Responsibilities of Corporate Directors, Address before the Research Institute of Economy, 
Trade & Industry, IAA (July 26, 2006), available at 
http://www.rieti.go.jp/en/events/bbl/06072601.html (stating that the National Association of 
Corporate Directors’ optimum board size is eight to eleven members). 
 50. See Peter Davis, Make-or-Break Criteria for Outside Directors, FAM. BUS. MAG., 
Spring 1993, at 1-2 (noting that boards of family-owned corporations often serve an 
advisory function with little actual authority). 
 51. Examples are brewers Anheuser-Busch, Molson Coors Brewing and snackfoods 
company Mars.  See Eleanor Wason & Jessica Hall, Vanishing Independence for Large 
Family Companies, THE INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, July 14, 2008, 
http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/07/14/business/deal15.php (discussing difficulties faced 
by family-run companies such as Anheuser-Busch in the modern business environment). 
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individuals, mostly from the same family.52 
The Control Model is the ideal representation of family business 
organizations in Asia, Europe, and Latin America.53  It features a 
concentrated shareholder base, illiquid shares, a tendency to be secretive, 
an intense focus on long-term strategy, a majority of insiders on the board, 
and a significant overlap between management and ownership.54  In 
particular, the Japanese Company Community corporate system reflects 
this model.55  Close corporations have these characteristics as well.56 
On the other hand, the Market Model is applicable to publicly-held 
organizations generally found in the United States and United Kingdom.57  
These businesses have dispersed shareholders, such as institutional 
investors and individual stockholders.58  Although there are controlling 
shareholders in certain companies, there is generally a “fluid aggregation of 
unaffiliated stockholders.”59  Share ownership is very liquid as owners can 
easily sell them to the public.60  These businesses are governed by strict 
corporate governance duties and have high levels of periodic or annual 
disclosure.61  There may be cases of short-term performance bias rather 
than long-term growth focus.62  The board is populated by outside 
 
 52. L. T. Larsson & L. Melin, The 2nd International Conference on Corporate 
Governance and Direction at the Henley Management College:  The Board of Directors 
Driving Swedish SMEs Forward:  Some Observations from a Non-executive Director 
Perspective (1999). 
 53. See Suzanne Lane et al., Guidelines for Family Business Boards of Directors, 19 
FAM. BUS. REV. 147 (June 2006) (noting that the Control Model is prevalent in geographical 
areas where ownership and control rights are concentrated). 
 54. Joseph H. Astrachan et al., Generic Models for Family Business Boards of 
Directors, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON FAMILY BUSINESS 320 (Panikkos Poutziouris, et 
al., eds., 2006). 
 55. Zenichi Shishido, Japanese Corporate Governance:  The Hidden Problems of 
Corporate Law and Their Solutions, 25 DEL. J. CORP. L. 189, 213-14 (2000) (noting that the 
Company Community system grants employees a level of informal control which serves to 
decrease “the diversity of the interests among those controlling the firm”). 
 56. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 341-356 (2008). 
 57. Astrachan et al., supra note 54, at 319. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 43 (Del. 1994) 
(“Control of the corporation is not vested in a single person, entity, or group, but vested in 
the fluid aggregation of unaffiliated shareholders.”). 
 60. Laura Nyantung Beny, Insider Trading Laws and Stock Markets Around the World: 
An Empirical Contribution to the Theoretical Law and Economics Debate, 32 IOWA J. CORP. 
L. 237, 249-52 (2007). 
 61. Id. at 269-70.  See also Gary K. Meek, Clare B. Roberts & Sidney J. Gray, Factors 
Influencing Voluntary Annual Disclosures by U.S., U.K. and Continental European 
Multinational Corporations, 26 J. INT'L BUS. STUD. 555 (1995) (studying the factors 
influencing voluntary disclosure of strategic, nonfinancial and financial information). 
 62. See generally Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, A New System of Corporate 
Governance: The Quinquennial Election of Directors, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 187 (1991) 
(examining multiple models of corporate governance and their influence on, inter alia, 
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independent board members and ownership of the shares is separated from 
the company’s management.63  Many family corporations in North America 
tend to reflect the Control Model, but large family corporations may 
already be mirroring the Market Model.64 
For family-run enterprises, there must be a constant balance of the 
culture, personalities, and self-interests as “board-management relations in 
family firms are often described as requiring simultaneous independence 
and interdependence, distance and closeness.”65  This balance is not always 
seen in publicly-held corporations,66 since shareholders do not know each 
other, shares are held in street name by the securities firm, and these 
residual owners are usually rationally apathetic to the day-to-day activities 
in the business.67 
C. The Role of the Board of Directors 
The role of the board of directors in a family-run company has certain 
similarities to boards of publicly-owned corporations.  The board’s roles in 
publicly held companies are the selection, evaluation, and rewarding of 
CEOs; monitoring of the officers’ compliance with national and state laws, 
IRS policies, and SEC rulings; and other supervisory functions.68  Boards 
of public companies likewise approve corporate strategies, assess these 
strategies periodically, and undertake CEO evaluation and board 
performance self-evaluation on a regular basis.69  “A good board will 
regularly question its own work; this self-examination enables the board to 
 
profit horizons). 
 63. Id. 
 64. Stephen J. Simurda, Going Public in a Rollup, FAM. BUS. MAG., Summer 1997, at 
1.  See Wayne Messick, Family Business as Big Business: It's Not Just Mom & Pop 
Anymore, IBIZRESOURCES, 
http://www.familybusinessstrategies.com/articles03/3263wdm.html (last visited Sept. 19, 
2009) (profiling several large, publicly traded family-owned corporations); Pete Engardio, 
Mom-and-Pop Multinationals, BUSINESSWEEK, July 14 & 21, 2008, at 77-78 (noting that 
small family businesses are increasingly sourcing services from across the globe). 
 65. Corbetta & Salvato, supra note 13, at 122. 
 66. See Samuel C. Johnson, WHY WE’LL NEVER GO PUBLIC, FAM. BUS. MAG., May 
1990, at 1 (stating that dealing with diverse shareholder expectations and potential takeovers 
encumbers most public corporation CEOs). 
 67. STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THEORY AND 
PRACTICE 202-03 (Oxford University Press 2008) (arguing that shareholders are rationally 
apathetic because the costs of expending time and energy to make an informed decision 
outweigh the possible benefits). 
 68. Id. at 157-62. 
 69. See Daniele Marchesani, The Concept of Autonomy and the Independent Director of 
Public Corporations, 2 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 315, 319-21 (2005) (discussing the different 
roles of boards of directors in the operation of large companies). 
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become a ‘learning organization.’”70  Board members do not perform day-
to-day functions, as these are reserved for the corporate officers.71  They 
provide advice and counsel to the officers and to the organization at large, 
lend their reputation to the firm, and, at times, use their social, professional, 
and political networks to further the company’s interests.72  Since these 
directors may also be directors in other large firms, they are able to bring 
with them vast amounts of corporate wisdom and experience. 
Family business boards with independent directors have similar 
qualities to independent boards of publicly-held companies.  However, 
insider boards are a different story because the owners are usually the 
managers themselves.73  For very small operations or sole proprietorships, 
the husband or the wife is the sole owner and manager, the children 
perform some work, and they employ one or two employees.74  They may 
not even have a board.75  If they do, it is most likely composed of a brother, 
a sister, and everyone else working in the business.76  These boards might 
be paper-only boards to satisfy government requirements for 
incorporation.77 
Larger, more sophisticated, and more evolved family-owned 
businesses will have boards with a few outsiders.78  Some will even have a 
majority of independent directors.79  These boards perform servicing, 
 
 70. F. Friedrich Neubauer, Good Boards Engage in Self-Evaluation, FAM. BUS. MAG., 
Summer 1995, at 1. 
 71. See Marchesani, supra note 69, at 319-20 (explaining the role of boards of directors 
of large companies). 
 72. See Lynne L. Dallas, The Multiple Roles of Corporate Boards of Directors, 40 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 781, 805-07 (2003) (explaining the relational role of the board). 
 73. See Peter Davis, The Politics of Family Boards, FAM. BUS. MAG., May 1990, at 1 
(stating that most privately held firms’ boards are mere legal fictions, dismissed because 
they are seen as obtrusive to the owners’ creativity and entrepreneurial spirit). 
 74. Brian A. Blum, The Goals and Process of Reorganizing Small Businesses in 
Bankruptcy, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 181, 188 (2000) (opining that small businesses 
comprise "Mom and Pop running their little store"). 
 75. See Interview by Dr. Nagendra V. Chowdary with John A. Davis, Senior Lecturer 
of Business Administration at Harvard Business School (May 2007), available at 
http://www.ibscdc.org/executive-interviews/Q&A_with_John_A_Davis_3.htm (discussing 
his research on managing family businesses, including the different types of family 
businesses and how to manage conflicts within family businesses). 
 76. See John A. Davis, Governing the Family-Run Business, HAR. BUS. SCH. WORKING 
KNOWLEDGE, Sept. 4, 2001, available at http://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/2469.html (discussing 
the ways to achieve effective governance in a family business). 
 77. See John A. Davis, Organizing the Family-Run Business, HAR. BUS. SCH. WORKING 
KNOWLEDGE, Oct. 1, 2001, available at http://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/2536.html (suggesting 
recommendations about how to create an effective board of directors). 
 78. See George G. Raymond Jr., Between Father and Son Stands . . . The Board, FAM. 
BUS. MAG., Winter 2002, at 4 (recalling the benefits of outside board members in the 
resolution of certain disputes at Lyon-Raymond Corp.). 
 79. See Comments of Andreas Sohmen-Pao, Managing Director of BW Shipping 
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advising, and supervising functions; guide the entity to target goals and the 
proper use of assets and resources; hire and fire the CEO; help develop and 
finally approve long-term strategies; and periodically assess the 
management and the board itself.80  They also protect the interests of the 
shareholders, oversee the family’s participation in the business, perform 
“diligent oversight,”81 and “help make big-picture business decisions.”82  
Boards are critical in succession issues, as they pick who will succeed the 
founder or existing CEO.83  Boards should ask challenging questions to 
management84 and, likewise, should interface with management on behalf 
of the shareholders.85  For Alexander, family boards are preeminently 
constituted to “maximize shareholder value under the guidelines and 
constraints given to it by the shareholders.”86 
Directors must be able to coordinate with the CEO (through the 
human resources department) on the list of potential successors, to guide 
and coach the successor-in-waiting or heir apparent (if an insider), to 
wisely intervene (if needed) in emotional outbursts due to succession 
crises, and to conduct a fair and reasonable selection process.87  They must 
also keep the company on track with any succession plan it has developed, 
and prevent the founder-CEO from unduly extending his or her term of 
office or delaying his or her predetermined retirement.88  A two-to-three-
year window for transition cannot unilaterally be extended to a five-to-
 
Managers, in Knowledge@SMU, The Source of Competitive Advantage in a Family 
Business is the Family, Mar. 3, 2008, available at 
http://knowledge.smu.edu.sg/article.cfm?articleid=1123 (stating that his family’s firm is 
comprised of a mix of family members and independent directors). 
 80. See Nancy Langton, The Role of Boards of Directors in a Family Business:  Three-
Circle Model Helps Define Role, THE GLOBE AND MAIL, September 26, 2005, at P1, P3 
(discussing how directors of a family business help manage the financial health of the 
business). 
 81. See MILLER & BRETON-MILLER, supra note 3, at 211-213 (“[D]irectors are the 
critical nexus between shareholders and top managers.  It is they who must establish and 
oversee the executive incentives and monitoring mechanisms.”). 
 82. John A. Davis & Keely Cormier, Board Directors of the Family Firm, HARV. BUS. 
SCH. Note 9-800-025, Mar. 2001, at 3-5. 
 83. A CEO who handpicks his successor, without guidance and in absolute mockery of 
his board of directors, is a corporate tyrant who fails to serve the interests of the 
shareholders.  Concomitantly, this elucidates an example of a disempowered, failing board. 
 84. See Marc A. Schwartz & Louis B. Barnes, Outside Boards and Family Businesses: 
Another Look, 4 FAM. BUS. REV. 269, 279-80 (Fall 1991) (assessing survey results from 
interviews with CEOs about the areas that outside directors are the most and least helpful). 
 85. Alexander, supra note 39. 
 86. Id. 
 87. See Ivan Lansberg, Independent Directors in the Middle, FAM. BUS. MAG., Summer 
1999, at 4 (declaring that boards of directors should help owners assess the feasibility of and 
assumptions underlying their vision for the future). 
 88. Id. at 7. 
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seven-year window.89  If provided with unfettered discretion, founders tend 
to keep themselves at the helm until the day they die.90  The board must be 
strict in this regard, yet they should also be the sounding board of the 
departing executive.91  It may be good that at least one of the independent 
directors is of the same age and stature as the departing founder-CEO so 
that the former can explain his or her own transition process and how he or 
she was able to successfully cope with life after twenty or thirty years in 
power.92  While all of these are the ideal functions of the board, the reality 
is different.  In the 2002 American Family Business Survey, approximately 
half of the respondents’ boards were found to have met only once or twice 
per year, while 13% of those who responded never met at all.  Seventy 
percent (70%) of the respondents said they have no board subcommittees, 
while a substantial number reported weak board performance.93  Worse, the 
survey revealed that most family businesses do not even use their directors 
in the CEO succession process.94 
As in the case of publicly-held companies, directors in family 
businesses have certain fiduciary duties to the shareholders and the 
corporation.95  They must exercise their duties in good faith, with the care 
that a typically prudent and responsible person in a similar position would 
do under similar circumstances, and in a manner that the directors (even 
non-family, minority directors) believe is in the best interests of the 
corporation.96  Boards make sure that managers manage the company 
optimally.97  Boards that fail to perform their specific functions include 
paper boards, management committee impersonators, shareholder group 
impersonators, and mere crony groupings.98 
In both family businesses and publicly-owned corporations, directors 
may be classified as insiders, grey, or independent.  For family businesses, 
insider directors are family members who run the businesses, such as the 
CEO or a kin who is the Vice-President.  Grey directors are not fully 
independent directors as they have significant business or relational ties 
 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 7-8. 
 93. Mike Cohn, Why Some Boards Work Better Than Others, FAM. BUS. MAG., Winter 
2004, at 1. 
 94. Id. 
 95. See JAMES J. JURINSKI & GARY A. ZWICK, TRANSFERRING INTERESTS IN THE 
CLOSELY HELD FAMILY BUSINESS 27 (2002) (discussing tax and business issues that affect 
family firms). 
 96. Id. 
 97. See generally Ira M. Millstein & Paul W. MacAvoy, The Active Board of Directors 
and Performance of the Large Publicly Traded Corporation, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1283, 1318 
(1998) (observing the link between active board monitoring and corporate performance). 
 98. Alexander, supra note 39. 
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with the company, yet were still considered as “outside” directors in the 
past.  Grey directors may be customers, suppliers, bank officers, or other 
industry members.  They may also be outside advisers who have existing or 
previous contracts with management.  Independent directors, on the other 
hand, are non-aligned, neutral directors who have absolutely no ties with 
the business by themselves or through their next of kin, do not have 
existing or previous contractual arrangements with the corporation, and 
have never been an employee or officer.  Some of these independent 
directors are CEOs or presidents of other large boards or institutions, deans 
or distinguished professors of business schools, or professionally trained 
individuals.  An independent board, therefore, would be a company board 
whose members are primarily composed of directors who are neither 
insiders nor grey directors, nor otherwise affiliated with the company one 
way or another. 
For Corbetta and Salvato, the critical measure of a board of directors 
is board capital, which is comprised of (a) adequate board size, (b) 
directors’ personal and occupational background and knowledge, and (c) 
board activism that encompassed collective processes and access to 
information.99  For them, the ideal governing bodies for successfully-run 
family businesses would be “large, active, and external boards, the latter 
characteristic usually meaning that nonexecutive directors should not have 
personal or professional relationships with the family or the firm.”100  
Though assisting in resolving family squabbles and dramas goes with the 
territory, independent directors must not be so drawn into battle that they 
lose competence and neutrality.  Stone has argued that: 
Outside directors are not shrinks.  They’re businesspeople trained to       
focus on business problems . . . [b]ut if they are confronted with a family 
situation, say, a rivalry between siblings for leadership, they could help 
move things forward by defining the leader’s role and structuring a 
communication process that acknowledges that both siblings want to be 
leaders.101 
 
 99. See Corbetta & Salvato, supra note 13, at 128 (“According to this logic, a large 
board entirely composed of insiders (i.e., current and former officers of the firm) will 
provide less resources and network links than an equally large board composed of insiders, 
business experts (e.g., current and former senior officers and directors of other firms), 
support specialists (e.g., lawyers, bankers, insurance company representatives, public 
relation experts), and community influentials (e.g., political leaders, university faculty, 
leaders of social or community organizations).”). 
 100. Id. at 121. 
 101. Deanne Stone, The Outsiders, FAM. BUS. MAG., Winter 2007, at 4. 
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1. Is a Board of Directors Needed and When? The Case of Vietri, 
Inc. 
It has been argued that not all family business enterprises need 
independent directors.  Indeed, some family businesses, especially those 
that have been recently established, may not need the presence of an 
independent board at all, or at least not during the formative years.102  If the 
businesses are too small, lacking a professional management team and 
effective financial systems, a formal board may be dangerous and a 
distraction.103  The reason is that companies in their very early years are, or 
should be, more concerned with how to ensure the following week’s 
payroll, what products to develop, and how these products should be 
marketed and sold.  Oftentimes, a board “champion” is needed to change 
the status quo of having no board of directors.104  This “champion” may be 
the founder himself, a successor, or a long-time manager who can convince 
the company leadership that a board of directors will help steer the business 
to greater heights.  Boards ought to be seen as valuable contributors by 
both first generation entrepreneurs and by well-seasoned family business 
executives.  They bring in not only sound advice and experience from the 
outside, but they may also serve to redirect the company to the route it 
should have taken in the first place.  Family companies derive substantial 
benefits from formal boards “of outside directors consisting of a majority 
 
 102. Howard Fischer & Jane Stevenson, Building the High-EQ Board, FAM. BUS. MAG., 
Summer 2007, at 2.  The Quaker Chemical Corp. is a leading global provider of process 
chemicals, chemical specialties, services, and technical expertise.  Id.  For the first thirty or 
so years of its corporate existence, there was a board of directors populated only by insiders.  
Id.  This was from 1918 to circa the 1950s.  Id.  When Peter A. Benoliel took over from his 
father in 1960s, he recruited two outside directors.  Id.  By the time the company went 
public in 1972, the board had a majority of outside directors.  Id.  By 1997, it had an eleven-
person board, eight of whom were outsiders.  Id.  It is still a very successful and profitable 
company today.).  “Sigismundus W. W. Lubsen, a Dutch citizen, succeeded Peter Benoliel 
as CEO in May 1993, breaking a decades-long tradition of family leadership.  Lubsen 
restructured the company, cutting the workforce by 10 percent and earmarking the savings 
for the growing Asian and South American markets.”  Quaker Chemical Corporation, 
ANSWERS.COM, http://www.answers.com/topic/quaker-chemical-corporation (last visited on 
Mar. 11, 2009).  But Mr. Lubsen’s term as CEO was short-lived as he resigned in mid-1995 
to join Netherlands-based Heineken N.V.  Id.  Then Chairman of the board Peter Benoliel 
stepped in as Acting CEO.  Id.  By 1997, Peter Benoliel vacated the position of Chairman of 
the board but remained a board member.  Id.  He left the board in 2005.  Id.  He had served 
as CEO for a total of 27 years and Chairman for 17 years.  See Donald J. Jonovic, What 
Most Businesses Need Before an Outside Board, FAM. BUS. MAG., Winter 1993, at 1-2 
(suggesting that an independent board may not be effective until the company has made it 
past the “transition between entrepreneurial venture and professional management”). 
 103. See Donald J. Jonovic, Outside Review in a Wider Context:  An Alternative to the 
Classic Board, 2 FAM. BUS. REV. 125, 126 (Summer 1989) (discussing why an outside board 
of directors may be inefficient for family companies). 
 104. See Davis, supra note 50, at 3. 
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of independent, risk-taking peers.”105 
In fact, there are some family-controlled businesses which started in 
their very first (founding) year with a fully operational, formal board of 
directors.  In the case of Vietri, Inc. (named after an Italian fishing village) 
of Hillsborough, North Carolina, a leading wholesaler of Italian ceramics, 
the two founding sisters, in the same year they founded the business, 
assembled a board of directors made up of themselves, close friends, and 
experts.106 
Luckily, the two Gravely sisters, Susan and Frances, who were 
traveling in Italy with their mother in 1983, chanced upon very finely 
crafted ceramic plates in the Amalfi coast where they were having lunch.107  
They immediately located the ceramicist, conducted “due diligence” in the 
next three days with the help of an interpreter, and struck a deal with the 
ceramicist to be the exclusive distributor of his products in the United 
States.108  Success immediately followed.  With success, they put in place a 
formal board of directors to guide them through growth and the growing 
pains of their lucrative dinnerware import business.109  One thing the sisters 
did wrong, however, was to appoint themselves as co-presidents of a 
thriving company.110  Certainly, tensions erupted between them that 
threatened the very fabric of the family, not just the business.111  But since 
they had the foresight to create a board at the infancy stage of the business, 
it became easier to manage and resolve the crises that came about.  The 
board they instituted was not an independent board; rather, upon their 
father’s counsel, it was a board composed of friends who had experiences 
in certain areas of business that the sisters did not.112  Although the board 
met only once a year, the sisters communicated with their board members 
individually half a dozen times per year, whether to seek business advice or 
as a sounding board for ideas.113  Despite being an insider board with one 
annual formal meeting, it was still a body that was able to assist, serve, and 
advise the founders. 
 
 105. See Jonovic, supra note 103, at 129. 
 106. See Deanne Stone, Making a Sibling Startup Work, FAM. BUS. MAG., Spring 1996, 
at 1-2 (discussing the history of Veitri, a family business that sells imported dinnerware and 
suggesting that a major reason for the company’s success has been its board of directors, 
consisting of the owners’ close friends).   
 107. Id.; Vietri, About Us, http://www.vietri.com/aboutus/aboutus.cfm (last visited Apr. 
30, 2008). 
 108. Vietri, About Us, http://www.vietri.com/aboutus/aboutus.cfm (last visited Apr. 30, 
2008). 
 109. Stone, supra note 106, at 5-6. 
 110. Id. at 6. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 4-5.  This meant that their board members were all grey directors as they had 
familial or relational ties with the owners of the business.  Id. 
 113. Id. at 5. 
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At one point, Susan Gravely was approached by a dinnerware 
company that wanted to be bought out by Vietri, Inc.114  She was very 
interested and excited with the prospect.  But after consulting with the 
board, it was decided that the businesses were not complementary.115  Had 
she not listened to the board’s sound advice, or if Vietri, Inc. had no board 
at all, then the sisters could have immediately jumped into a business 
venture not knowing the traps and liabilities of that company.  In time, the 
board proved instrumental in making the sisters-owners more mature and 
sensitive in their approach to the business.  Susan eventually became the 
president and Frances became the vice-president for marketing.116  They 
were able to “[carve] out separate domains” for each sibling.117  Many years 
later, when the board recommended to Susan Gravely that she needed to 
designate a successor just in case something happened to her, she maturely, 
yet painfully, anointed Vietri, Inc.’s ten-year accountant instead of her 
sister, Frances.118  The latter accepted the decision.119  The board, in 
essence, played a key role in ensuring that the sibling rivalry ordinarily 
found between sisters did not threaten to consume the enterprise.120  Vietri, 
Inc. continues to be a profitable business today. 
D. Fiduciary Duties of Loyalty, Care and Good Faith to Minority  
Shareholders 
Duties of loyalty, good faith, and care are not exclusive to publicly-
held corporations.  In a family business, these duties are owed by majority 
shareholders/directors to the minority.  A breach of the duty of care may 
render a family company director (or officer) liable for negligence, while a 
violation of the duty of loyalty may render such director (or officer) liable 
for unfair self-interested transactions and other improprieties.  The 
difficulty with applying these duties to family companies or close 
corporations is that minority shareholders are not adequately protected.  
Termination of a family member/corporate officer may be justified as fair, 
given the circumstances.  The decisions of a board will be judged, initially, 
in line with the “business judgment rule”—the presumption that the 
decisions and actions of a board of directors were based on adequate 
information and good faith, reached with the best interests of the company 
in mind, and that good business practices and reliable processes marked 
 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 6. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 7. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
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these decisions as used by courts of equity.  Some of the critical 
determinants would be if the shareholder/family member was treated 
unequally, and in the process his legitimate or reasonable expectations were 
defeated (what other similarly situated shareholders would have expected 
and believed as fair).  The extent of the lack of disinterestedness (a 
component of independence) and absence of abuse of discretion will also 
be tested.  Grossly negligent or uninformed boards will most often be held 
accountable and liable by courts of equity.121 
In a 1988 case, the trial court judge ruled that there are four specific 
fiduciary duties that shareholder-managers in a close corporation (such as a 
family business) owe each other:  (1) to act with that degree of diligence, 
care, and skill which ordinarily prudent persons would exercise under 
similar circumstances in like positions; (2) to discharge the duties affecting 
their relationship in good faith with a view to furthering the interests of one 
another as to matters within the scope of the relationship; (3) to disclose 
and not withhold from one another relevant information affecting the status 
and affairs of the relationship; and (4) to not use their position, influence, 
or knowledge respecting the affairs of the organization that are subject to 
the relationship to gain any special privilege or advantage over the other 
person or persons involved in the relationship.122 
More recently, board directorship has become riskier.  The onslaught, 
in 2000-2001, of scandals such as Enron, Worldcom, Tyco, and Adelphia 
has made life more difficult for CEOs, CFOs, and directors of public and 
privately-held companies.  One problem with serving as a director (whether 
as an insider or an independent) in a family-controlled business is that the 
candidate is not usually informed of, or educated about, the potential 
liabilities facing board members.  Directors in family businesses must bear 
in mind that they are not immune from shareholder lawsuits123 that center 
on self-dealing transactions or unethical behavior.  They can instantly get 
caught up as blameless participants in a family feud that they have nothing 
to do with, except being a director in the family company.124  In fact, they 
may even be closer to the line of fire because of the closed nature of the 
business.125  Directors may be sued “by shareholders, competitors, 
 
 121. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985) (holding that a standard 
of gross negligence is applied in business judgment director liability). 
 122. See Rosenthal v. Rosenthal, 543 A.2d 348, 352 (Me. 1988) (detailing the four 
fiduciary duties owed by business associates to each other). 
 123. See Powell, supra note 30, at 1-2 (noting that family directors may be subject to 
shareholder lawsuits). 
 124. Id. 
 125. See Visscher, supra note 41, at 2 (“[A]ccording to a Wall Street Journal report, a 
study of more than 200 corporate fraud cases brought before the Securities and Exchange 
Commission between 1987 and 1997 revealed that most financial-statement fraud is 
committed by companies with tiny market capitalizations.”). 
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suppliers, unions, customers and other private citizens, and even by . . . 
fellow directors,”126 as well as by employees and the government.  
Although this may spook putative independent directors or make it harder 
for family businesses to retain them, adequate director and officer (D&O) 
insurance may assuage possible restlessness and fear of liability. 127  There 
are specific insurance products for independent directors in family-
controlled entities. 
III. POWERFUL OR POWERLESS?  THE CHALLENGES OF INDEPENDENT 
DIRECTORS 
One important quality that a very successful family business founder-
CEO often lacks is objectivity.  The CEO may be the best in the industry 
and control the organization in an optimal and ethical manner, but still lack 
the necessary impartiality and emotional detachment that generally 
characterize present-day CEOs of publicly-traded companies.  Founder-
CEOs may be too attached or too close to the enterprise,128 feeling that it is 
a legacy handed down by esteemed forefathers or a legacy they are handing 
down.  They may be too sympathetic with workers’ plight, or too caught up 
with the notion of family and close family ties. 
A CEO may also overreach129 and be too self-absorbed or may not 
want to relinquish the power and authority he earned throughout the years.  
Instead of identifying redundancies that may impede efficiency, he may 
retain employees who serve the same function out of loyalty.  This may be 
to the company’s detriment in the long-run.  As Dyer put it: 
[B]ecause founders are often reluctant to have a governing board 
review their decisions, there are no checks and balances.  
Without an outside perspective to give the decisions a “reality 
check” . . . there is a strong possibility that the business will join 
70 percent of those that fail in the first generation.  In a number 
of cases, we have seen founders who, because of poor 
information or because of age and senility, make decisions that 
 
 126. See Powell, supra note 30, at 2 (noting the various groups able to sue directors). 
 127. See Visscher, supra note 41, at 3 (finding that retaining and attracting directors 
requires remedying the fear of liability). 
 128. Robert K. Mueller, Differential Directorship:  Special Sensitivities and Roles for 
Serving the Family Business Board, 1 FAM. BUS. REV. 239 (1988) (describing the likelihood 
of the family executive to be too close to the business to have a correct perspective on issues 
facing the company). 
 129. See, e.g., Shel Horowitz, Sam Steinberg's Non-Lasting Legacy, U. MASS. AMHERST 
FAM. BUS. CTR., 2008, http://www.umass.edu/fambiz/articles/business_tales/steinberg.html 
(last visited Jan. 29, 2009) (describing how a founder’s refusal to trust control of his 
business to anyone outside his family damaged it and forced its sale). 
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destroy the business.130 
Independent directors, due to their detached relationships with the 
company and lack of any special or financial relationship with its members, 
fill in the gap as objective and emotionally-detached arbiters.  They help 
keep the balance of the ship and provide the captain with relevant 
information and corporate wisdom that will steer the firm away from 
disaster.  Playing both the hull and the keel, they are able to perform an 
effective role as to where the company is sailing.  Dubbed as strangers and 
outsiders, independent directors possess the qualities that a successful 
family CEO or entrepreneur may lack.  They similarly have the prerogative 
to recommend an alternative course of action, redirect business goals, 
constructively criticize management programs, and advise on matters 
pertinent to corporate growth.  They may also fill in any skills or 
networking gaps that hound the owners.  Similarly, independent directors 
“deal with the pragmatic realities and idiosyncrasies of the family 
owners.”131  At bottom, independent directors are not powerless or impotent 
in any way.  In fact, they may sometimes be viewed with a suspicious and 
envious eye by family members, both within and outside of the board, as 
they may be a repository of authority. 
The presence of independent directors may galvanize the family board 
members to spring into action relative to succession issues, business 
projections and plans, hiring and firing policies, competence of the 
management team, and the retention of professional consultants.  These 
things may have been neglected by family boards since they are 
accustomed to trusting an older sibling to do everything and, thus, have 
waived accountability and transparency.  According to Howard Fischer and 
Jane Stevenson, “To create the ideal board for your company, you need 
outside directors who will hold you accountable.  You should have the right 
mix of talents, personalities, and experience.  Above all in a family 
company, you need people with high emotional intelligence.”132 
A. Concrete Understanding of the Family Culture133 
Despite wielding tremendous authority or the potential to be very 
influential, independent directors often face opposition from within the 
board and beyond it.  Instead of being supported as steward-arbiters, they 
may be showered with skepticism and distrust, if not malice.  The familial 
 
 130. DYER, supra note 4, at 71. 
 131. Davis, supra note 50, at 1. 
 132. Fischer & Stevenson, supra note 102, at 1. 
 133. See WARD, supra note 15, at 18 (“The culture of the family business-–its leadership 
and its organization-–influences the achievements of the business far more than any other 
factor.”). 
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and relational setting of a family business is not traditionally open or 
receptive to strangers.  According to Cleveland family business consultant 
Donald Jonovic, “‘They’re used to playing close to the chest, so bringing in 
an outsider is like disrobing in front of a stranger for the first time.  Taking 
that initial step is hard to do.’”134  The reason for this is simple:  as a close 
corporation, they are accustomed to working with dad or mom, with an 
uncle or an older sibling.  In-house supervision and advising is enough; 
bringing in a boardroom “policeman” from the outside is suspicious.  The 
introduction of an independent director to the board—which could be 
interpreted as the arrival of a professional critic with policing functions but 
who has contributed nothing to the corporation’s working—may be the 
sign of a shake-up that some family members, including the company 
president and chairman, fear.135  As a corollary, independent directors are 
accused of not knowing the business and/or the industry to be worthy of 
any policing functions. 
As a natural reaction to the entry of someone new into a pre-existing 
family business culture, the independent director must not expect a red 
carpet upon his arrival.  The independent director must, on the contrary, be 
on guard as to the sensitivities of the directors he will be working with and 
those in the management.  It will take time and effort to be completely 
absorbed and accepted by a family business board and its management.  
The initial blemish of distrust and lack of knowledge of the inner workings 
of the company can gradually be swept away if the independent director 
behaves professionally, and takes the time to understand the culture and 
business dynamics, comprehend corporate finances, and internalize office 
or board politics.  Friendliness, approachability, prompt attendance, active 
and educated participation in board meetings, and working with a positive 
aura will work wonders.  Once successfully integrated, the independent 
director is set to do wonders for the family-controlled company.  As 
dispassionate and open communicators, they can mediate between family 
members.136  They can also contribute to succession programs, transition 
periods, selection of key officers, and other important business decisions. 
Absent a complete understanding of the family culture, the 
independent director may never get beyond the initial impression he makes 
as a stranger lacking in specific business or industry knowledge.  If 
approached poorly, the independent director can forever remain the 
suspicious outsider that he initially is.  A good example of a family culture 
where this idea can be applied is the Wolf Organization.  A national 
 
 134. Stone, supra note 101, at 2 (quoting Donald Jonovic). 
 135. See Mike Cohn, Are You Ready for ‘Outsiders’?, FAM. BUS. MAG., Spring 2003, at 
2 (describing the difficulties inherent to choosing directors in a family business setting). 
 136. See Raymond, supra note 79 (noting the calming influence of dispassionate outside 
directors on familial relationships). 
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provider of construction materials through its lumber yard, with a well-
known advertising and marketing agency, the Wolf Organization is hard to 
miss in the materials industry.137  Founded in 1843 by Adam Wolf, the 
business has grown from a very modest dry goods and lumber store in rural 
Pennsylvania into a more than $250 million enterprise.138  The Wolf 
Organization’s website touts that, “Wolf and his descendants developed the 
business into a family heirloom, strengthening it from generation to 
generation.”139  The business has a unique transition structure which forms 
a crucial part of their family culture.  The business is typically bought out 
by one or two sons from the father at market value, implying the certainty 
that siblings who refuse to buy-in to the business or who do not have the 
means to purchase the business will be deprived of both ownership and 
participation.140  Though this seems common or expected in the larger 
business world, it is not so common in the family business setting.  The 
result, again caused by the family culture, is that sons, who buy the 
business from their parents, do not treat the entity as a family legacy.  
Rather, they treat it as a mere business venture that they are not required to 
perpetuate.141  The family buyers are trained since childhood to see the 
business as an investment opportunity.  Therefore, when it is the sons’ time 
to purchase the business they simply act as interested investors and 
financial buyers—assessing the company in terms of potential return on 
investments, capitalization structure, liquidity, sufficiency of assets and 
other criteria normally used by an outsider buying a company.142  This 
extreme view of perceiving the family business merely as a business, plus 
the market value or cost associated with acquiring it, may have caused the 
substantial divestiture of the sixth generation.143  Since the family business 
was seen simply as an investment, when there is a good deal to sell it, the 
best option is to take the opportunity to liquidate.144  As of now, only 30% 
of ownership in the family business remains in family hands.145  The other 
70% of the shares has been acquired by a private equity firm.146  And of the 
 
 137. See Operating Divisions:  The Wolf Organization, 
http://www.wolforg.net/divisions.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2009) (describing TWO’s 
operating divisions as distribution and advertising). 
 138. See About:  The Wolf Organization, http://www.wolforg.net/about.htm (last visited 
Jan. 29, 2009) (describing the history of the Wolf Organization). 
 139. Id. 
 140. Tom Wolf, former CEO of the Wolf Organization, Presentation at Wharton 
School’s Course on Strategies and Practices of Family-Controlled Companies (Apr. 15, 
2008) (on file with author). 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Wolf, supra note 138. 
 146. Id. 
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30%, not all owners are family-related, as some are outside investors.147 
This family culture148 must immediately be understood by any 
independent director serving on the board of directors of the Wolf 
Organization.  If this is not clear to such director, he may constantly be 
asking—to the point of annoyance—why family members, who formerly 
led the business, are intent on cashing out of the business.  He may 
question why the business is treated more as a financial investment rather 
than as a genuine heirloom to be passed from one generation to the next.  
Mistaking family culture for stewardship, he may press hard for alterations 
to it, unaware and uninformed that this has been a family tradition for over 
150 years.  Instead of helping the organization, he may in fact be hurting it.  
Instead of performing a harmonizing role, he may be dividing the family 
members.149  As one Illinois family consultant has stated: 
“Outsiders can never know the whole history of family 
resentments [or culture]; they can only be aware of the surface 
issues. Part of [the] . . . job as the outsider is getting everyone on 
the board on the same page.  The biggest value an outsider can 
bring is helping the family find consensus on a plan of action for 
moving ahead.”150 
In addition, a company leader who fails to learn and understand a 
company’s culture and adopt it runs the risk of running the company in 
contradiction to how the founders and older generation employees 
envisioned.151 
There is no one way by which independent directors should approach 
their role in the board.  It will depend upon the circumstances of the 
business, its internal workings, the board politics, and primarily the 
attitudes and belief system of the patriarch/matriarch and progeny.  The 
 
 147. Id. 
 148. See Corbetta & Salvato, supra note 13, at 126 (“[T]he culture dimension measures 
the degree of identification between family and business values, and the impact such values 
have on the firm, as mediated from the family’s commitment to the business.”). 
 149. See Lansberg, supra note 87, at 2 (“Independent directors can bring a wealth of 
business experience and strategic skills to the boardroom table, but without an 
understanding of the interplay of family and business, the independent directors may be 
truly unprepared to help resolve some of the organizational dilemmas that arise in family 
enterprises.  Forced to deal with those issues, they may become disillusioned and quit, or 
they may become a detrimental influence, seeking to impose solutions inappropriate to the 
circumstances of the system they are serving”). 
 150. Stone, supra note 101, at 4 (quoting Dennis Kessler, a consultant specializing in 
family businesses). 
 151. See John A. Davis et al., Stevenson Industries (A), HARV. BUS. SCH. Note 9-802-
086, June 2005, at 14 (“[T]o bring in a chief operating officer who would first learn the 
Stevenson culture and grow into the CEO position.  Paul Steel had the track record, but the 
nature of a leader in a family company is extraordinarily tricky.  It’s the nuances of the 
personal relationships that, in the end, make it or break it.”). 
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approach must be flexible, open, communicative, and even contingent.152  
A given director must understand the family culture if they are to be 
effective in their servicing and advising functions. 
B. How Can Independent Directors Improve Company Stewardship? 
As non-company insiders, independent directors sitting on the boards 
of family-run businesses report to no one except the shareholders and the 
company as a whole.  They are neither subservient nor beholden to the 
founder/president, and they are not necessarily friends with the heir-
apparent.  Moreover, they are not blood relatives of any kind.  Thus, they 
have a very unique role in that they can serve and guide management, 
curtail excessiveness, police regressive policies, and promote the interests 
of the corporation.  As Stone has discovered: 
Governance specialists have observed that outsiders are often the 
only directors willing to challenge a family company’s 
leadership.  In fact, [Jeff Hester, who used to run Pierce Foods 
based in Winchester, Va.,] has found that he does his best work 
when disagreeing with a family member.  “I concentrate on 
what’s best for the company,” he says.  “I may side with one 
person on one issue and another on a different issue, and over 
time, if I’m lucky, they’ll see that I don’t play favorites.  I make a 
point of never repeating any ‘he said/she said’ conversations.  It 
takes diplomacy to explain why I see things differently, and it 
takes time to develop the family’s trust.”153 
Independent directors help professionalize the company.  Independent 
directors also add more neutrally-minded professionals and reduce conflicts 
of interests (or the appearance of conflicts of interests)154 which are usually 
found in close corporations.  This does not mean that independent directors 
are recruited precisely to contradict or disagree with the founder-CEO or 
make life more difficult for him.  They do not necessarily comprise a so-
called “opposition party.”  They are there to encourage stewardship while 
creating a family-friendly atmosphere where ideas can be discussed and 
 
 152. See Corbetta & Salvato, supra note 13, at 124 (noting that differently-structured 
businesses lend themselves to differently-structured boards). 
 153. Stone, supra note 101, at 1. 
 154. See Visscher, supra note 41, at 1 (“That’s why my own family business--a fourth-
generation global market leader in advanced metal transformation and coatings, based in 
Belgium--is adapting our governance system to allow for greater independence and to 
reduce any potential conflict of interest.  For example, while most of our directors are 
family members, the majority of the audit and nominating committee members are 
outsiders.  We also have reduced family representation on subsidiary boards. Sarbanes-
Oxley does not prohibit family members from sitting on subsidiary boards, but we have 
taken extra steps to avoid the appearance of a conflict of interest.”). 
OSIFINAL_SIX 1/22/2010  5:14:57 PM 
206 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 12:1 
 
business plans harmonized. 
As they are total outsiders to the business, it is easier for independent 
directors to look inside the box from the outside.  Insiders are too trapped 
inside the box to wield an impartial view.  Founder-CEOs are oftentimes so 
immersed in operating the business that they seem to neglect the basic 
question of who will succeed them in case of retirement, death, or 
disability.155  Other insiders, if asked who should take over the business, 
would immediately and forcefully declare “my son” or “my daughter,” or 
at times, “my in-law.”  The problem is that there are occasions when none 
of these family members is the right fit for the job and, as a corollary, a 
non-family vice president or regional manager is the best fit.  In that case, 
will the founder-CEO step up to the plate and declare his son, daughter, or 
in-law ineligible at this time and push for the non-family vice president or 
manager?  Hardly, though it happens.  Conversely, independent directors 
will rarely have qualms about declaring the non-family manager is the best 
for the position.  This sort of action conforms with an independent 
director’s stewardly objectives of providing objective service over self-
interest, and looking at the broad, long-term gains and values over myopic 
sentimentality.  With clear processes and open communications, they will 
be able to succeed in their objectives even with the stubbornness of the 
family, the founder, or both. 
In case the family business is in the process of moving towards being 
publicly-held, in alignment with stewardship, independent directors will 
also play an important role.  During this process the business is considered 
a “threshold company,”156 and many problems may arise for which neither 
the founder-CEO nor the family might be prepared.  Independent directors 
fulfill the roles of preceptors, technical advisers, and arbitrators.157  As 
preceptors, independent directors can tutor the CEO of the family business 
on how to become the CEO of a publicly-managed firm.  As technical 
advisors, they can show the CEO how finance, taxation, securities, 
marketing, and law interact with each other.158  An outside board can serve 
as an informal “court of first resort”159 when family conflicts arise.160  
Though it is not their duty to meddle in family squabbles, the board may 
serve as an informal forum—with the independent directors as arbitrators—
 
 155. MGMT. CONSULTING SERVS. DIV., AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCT., ASSISTING 
CLOSELY HELD BUSINESSES TO PLAN FOR SUCCESSION 21/100-1 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. 
Acct’s. 1992). 
 156. Thomas L. Whisler, The Role of the Board in the Threshold Firm, 1 FAM. BUS. REV. 
309, 309-10 (1988). 
 157. Id. at 314. 
 158. Id. at 314-15. 
 159. Id. at 315. 
 160. Id. 
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leading to pacified discussion and face-saving.161 
C. An Advisory Body in Lieu of an Independent Board? 
Family business boards are caught in a quandary:  they want their 
privacy yet they need outside advice and counseling.  There have been 
suggestions that, in order to achieve these objectives, they must get 
outsiders into the picture but not directly into the policy-making.  The 
presence of outsiders has led to either:  (1) advisory boards composed of 
some outsiders which give the CEO-founder, management, and insiders-
only board specific input or expertise, as needed162 or (2) advisory boards 
working only with management (the founder-CEO at the helm) when there 
is no board of directors.163  The latter is the result of recommendations that, 
in order to eliminate potential lawsuits against directors, family businesses 
of a certain size ought to reconsider their boards of directors and replace 
them with advisory councils with experienced outsiders.164  It is also the 
result of a family business that is not yet ready to form a board of directors 
but is in need of outside expert advice.165  An advisory board—composed 
of an “accountant, an attorney, the senior owner-managers, perhaps an 
industry consultant, and possibly a representative of non-participating 
shareholders”166 —conceptually shields the outsiders from lawsuits as it 
does not represent the corporation but merely makes recommendations.  
One important matter to acknowledge, however, is that “[t]he risk of legal 
liability should not be a controlling element in deciding what type of board 
[(formal or advisory)] is best for a family company.”167 
Would putting a former or present CEO of a well-run business into the 
pool of company advisors be the same as appointing him as an independent 
director on the board?  Can the scope of the functions of an advisory 
council even compare to that of a fully functioning, non-rubberstamp board 
of directors?  Can advisory boards serve well as “a half-way house?”168  It 
must be stated that the role of professional advisors and advisory bodies is 
 
 161. Id. 
 162. Charles W. Murdock, The Formal Board vs. The Advisory Board, FAM. BUS. MAG., 
Spring 1997, at 1. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. at 2. 
 165. See Jonovic, supra note 102, at 125 (explaining that companies only require outside 
boards when they reach a certain level of development, but may require outside advice 
earlier). 
 166. Id. 
 167. Murdock, supra note 163, at 2. 
 168. FRED NEUBAUER & ALDEN G. LANK, THE FAMILY BUSINESS:  ITS GOVERNANCE FOR 
SUSTAINABILITY 99 (1998) (suggesting that an advisory board can be a compromise between 
no outside influence and the actual sharing or delegating of power to people outside the 
family). 
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very much distinct from that of an independent director and an independent 
board.169  The rules governing an advisory body or council usually state that 
the advisory body does not represent the company.  Rather, its activities are 
merely hortatory;170 it has no enforcement power, and it serves at the 
pleasure of the company CEO or president.171  Though important in some 
respects, the council makes its members beholden to, if not dominated by, 
the CEO or president.  The members’ independence is hence called into 
question.172 
But the readiness of a family entity to fully accept and truly form an 
effective board must be taken into consideration.173  There are family 
businesses with multimillion-dollar earnings and with almost one hundred 
employees but which may not yet be ready to have a board.174  Specifically, 
the owner-managers may not yet be prepared to handle the balancing nature 
and advising function of an independent body such as a board of 
directors.175  Boards cannot be forced upon a company; that would itself be 
coercive and draconian.  Closely-held companies and their founder-CEOs 
must be convinced, gradually over time, to wholeheartedly accept into the 
fold a governing board.  Lasting change does not happen overnight.  
Forming a competent board does not happen in a week. 
It must be explained to the founding family that a board can 
potentially work wonders for the enterprise.  The founding family’s call for 
privacy should be balanced with the need for informed, active, flexible, and 
fiscalizing directors inside the board.  Professional advisors, such as 
retained law firms, accountants and auditors, management consultants, and 
the like, are not in a position to effect real and substantial change.  Even 
assuming their assistance was sought in the first place, they are mere 
recommenders of appropriate action.176  Usually, the boards receive written 
reports from advisory bodies or outside professionals and make their 
decisions based on these reports.  A fully independent director who 
negotiates, mediates, clarifies, discusses, and rationally disagrees with 
managing family members ought to be recognized differently from a mere 
recommender of action. 
Oftentimes, founder-CEOs need to be exposed to independent director 
 
 169. See Murdock, supra note 163, at 2 (stating that unlike an independent board which 
has final authority for the management of a corporation, an advisory board serves at the 
discretion of the CEO). 
 170. NEUBAUER & LANK, supra note 169, at 100-02. 
 171. See Murdock, supra note 163, at 2 (contending that the bylaws of an advisory board 
often state that the board has no power). 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
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positions themselves in order to recognize the importance of independence 
and the wisdom independent directors bring to the table.  If a founder-CEO 
is tapped to serve as an independent professional in another family 
company’s advisory body, he or she will soon realize that the group is just 
advisory and wields no substantial power.177  The founder-CEO might find 
it useless to be sitting in a seemingly lame-duck post and may resign 
eventually.178  If the founder-CEO is tasked to be an independent director, 
on the other hand, he or she will find value and fulfillment in the position 
as he or she is able to help guide the business.  He or she may perhaps be 
encouraged later on to add independent directors179 to his or her own 
board,180 assuming he or she has none.  If the reality, however, is that the 
company is ill-prepared at the moment for a formal board, then an advisory 
council or “review council,”181 may be the next best option.182 
D. When Should Independent Directors Take Their Seats? 
Before this particular question is answered, it must be asked, “When 
should a board of directors first be constituted?”  John M. Nash, founder 
and President Emeritus of the National Association of Corporate Directors 
(NACD), recommended that business owners who never had an active 
board (most likely start-ups or even long-established businesses that simply 
saw no need to create a board) might want to begin the process by creating 
an advisory board, as opposed to starting with a full-fledged board of 
 
 177. See id. (contending that the stereotypical family board ratifies almost all of a CEO’s 
actions). 
 178. Id. 
 179. See Roberts, supra note 17, at 1-14 (discussing the history of the family-run 
business founded by Sam Steinberg).  Lawyers, like any professionals, would be great 
contributors as independent directors.  Id.  If the lawyer’s firm is not consulting with or 
retained by the company, and the lawyer is not linked by blood or employment, then he or 
she can perfectly fit the role as an outsider to the board.  Id.  He or she can provide great 
legal advice, guide the company as to where it can go and where not to go, and update the 
directors on current developments in law.  Id.  He or she can help iron out succession issues, 
the family charter, reincorporation matters, acquisitions or mergers, and other business 
decisions that would need legal expertise.  Id.  He or she can assist in taxation issues as well.  
Id.  An example would be the personal attorney of Sam Steinberg who once sat as a director 
of the board of the then-dominant Steinberg’s supermarket chain in Quebec.  Id.  But it must 
be pointed out that he sat as a grey director (he was then employed by Sam Steinberg) and 
not as an independent one.  Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Jonovic, supra note 103, at 125, 135-36.  Jonovic, as early as 1989, cautioned about 
abruptly instituting a formal board in an unprepared family business atmosphere.  Id. at 127. 
He notes that boards can fail through “misplaced diplomacy,” “inappropriate direction,” 
“presumed synergy” or “infallibility.”  Id. at 130-31. 
 182. See Powell, supra note 30, at 9 (discussing the preference by some companies to 
establish an advisory board, rather than a formal board). 
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directors.183  Other than avoidance of liability,184 an advisory board may be 
a good start for business owners who fear that a board with outside 
directors might unduly interfere with their decisions.  An advisory board 
can easily evolve into a full board with monitoring capabilities, once the 
business owners realize that the board is not a threat, but rather, a 
complement to the entity and the owner’s business goals.185  Ideally, instead 
of treating the board as a threatening structure, founders should regard a 
board as a “deliberative peer body”186 which serves as “a conscience, a 
memory, a forum, and a support system. . . . [F]amily companies . . . 
[should] realize that having outside directors can be an enormous asset in 
achieving the owners’ dreams and strategic objectives.”187 
There is a lot of truth in Nash’s pronouncements.  However, there is 
equally as much truth in the argument that it may also be in the best interest 
of the family-run company for the founder-CEO to constitute a board of 
directors in the early stages of founding the business.  This decision will 
have to be reached based on several factors already enumerated, such as the 
preparedness of the founder-CEO to receive outside advice, the 
circumstances of the business, and the openness of the business family.188  
An early board will presumably help resolve early pains.  A forced board is 
certainly going to be a mocked board:  the founder may treat the board as 
though it does not exist or may even fail to call a meeting.  If the founder 
realizes the merits of a board very early in the corporate history and is not 
constrained or threatened with directorial advising and check-and-balance 
prerogatives (as was the case of the Gravely sisters of Vietri, Inc.), then the 
business will ultimately benefit.189  Mathile describes, in a self-confessing 
article, his earlier hesitation about immediately forming a formal board 
when he acquired control of a company,190 but he knew he needed help.  
After committing the mistake of anointing a board of cronies, he 
subsequently fired them and constituted a truly independent body which 
gave him sound advice and served as his confidants.191 
In the event that such founder does not see it fit that a board ought to 
be constituted very soon after he organizes the business or just after he 
 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. 
 186. See Murdock, supra note 163, at 1 (discussing the various forms of “peer bodies,” 
which include a legal board and an advisory board). 
 187. Fischer & Stevenson, supra note 102, at 2. 
 188. Powell, supra note 30, at 9; Murdock, supra note 163, at 1-4. 
 189. See Stone, supra note 106, at 1-2 (suggesting that the Gravely’s business was 
successful from its inception, in part, because it had an experienced board of directors). 
 190. Clayton L. Mathile, A Business Owner’s Perspective on Outside Boards, 1 FAM. 
BUS. REV. 223, 231 (Sept. 1988). 
 191. Id. at 231-34. 
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makes his first few sales, then at the very least a board must be constituted 
when it is in the process of professionalization.192  This is, in Jonovic’s 
view, the point of “significant evolution” and “threshold phase” which 
comprises formalized shareholder agreements, agreements on goals and 
business objectives, accurate accounting information, and a strong, 
coordinated middle management.193  Alexander also notes that, other than 
the period of professionalization, boards should be constituted once the 
company reaches the point when the first non-employee shareholder 
appears.194  Boards may also be constituted after the formation of a family 
council and the drafting of a family constitution.195 
In preparation for a board, other than ego-readiness of the founder-
CEO, businesses must develop a board manual196 containing everything 
from business history, shareholder expectations, remuneration, meetings, 
directorial expectations, time commitments, and committees.197  Directors 
must likewise be screened, interviewed, and selected well.198 
Normally, once a business institutes a board of directors, the board 
will initially be filled with insiders—in other words, family members and 
close friends.199  Sam Stevenson of Stevenson Industries, despite professing 
his commitment to managerial professionalism, started the practice of 
appointing non-family external board members, who happened to be his 
father’s attorney and his own childhood sailing buddies.200  This may be 
 
 192. See Jonovic, supra note 102, at 1 (suggesting that once a business is truly set up as a 
going concern, an independent board of directors should be put in place to provide an 
objective long-term view of the business). 
 193. See id. (“A board does not become important or potentially effective until the 
company is well through the ‘threshold’ transition between entrepreneurial venture and 
professional management.”). 
 194. Alexander, supra note 39. 
 195. See CRUZ, supra note 14, at 74 (noting a family business’ readiness to implement a 
board of directors in spite of continuing management by family members). 
 196. Gardner W. Heidrick, Selecting Outside Directors, 1 FAM. BUS. REV. 271, 273 
(Sept. 1988). 
 197. Id. at 275. 
 198. See Fischer & Stevenson, supra note 102, at 3-5 (suggesting that a rigorous 
selection process for directors is critical to selecting the right board). 
 199. See Stone, supra note 106, at 4 (discussing how the successful Gravely sisters, who 
founded Vietri, Inc., initially turned to their friends to sit on the company’s first board of 
directors). 
 200. Davis & LaChapelle, supra note 36, at 3-5.  This is quite unfortunate since external, 
non-family board members should be as far divorced from the family as possible.  Id.  
However, his father’s lawyer and his own childhood sailing friends were too close to the 
family and to him.  Id.  This may have called into question his adherence to avoid nepotism 
and his commitment to strict professionalism.  Id.  More particularly, in 1986, the board of 
Stevenson Industries was composed of three family members, three company executives, 
and three non-family outsiders (the family lawyer and Sam’s two childhood sailing friends).  
Id.  This meant that all nine board members were either insiders or grey directors with no 
independent director at all.  Id.  The situation improved in the 1990s.  Id. 
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because of the trust the family had in them and the way by which they were 
selected and appointed.  If a board is made up primarily (or exclusively) of 
family members or childhood friends, little effort for the selection and the 
appointment of directors is needed.  The sad reality, however, is that this 
type of board does not perpetuate the business and may lead to its abrupt 
conclusion.201  Arbitrariness may be the name of the game.  If a board is to 
be constituted, it must either be a completely independent one or stacked 
with as many independent directors as possible.202  The more independent 
directors, the better it is for the company; the more inside family members, 
the worse it is for the business.203 
When should family boards have independent directors?  Is there a 
dollar amount or business size that must be attained before the owners 
engage independent directors?  The most opportune time for the entry of 
independent directors is the time the board is constituted, or at least “the 
sooner, the better.”204  For sure, businesses will first want their own kin to 
be on the board; this is human nature and quite understandable.205  
Humorously, Jonovic writes that most business owners prefer insiders as 
directors since this makes it a “nice, comfortable board, chosen from a 
wide range of hangers-on, non-entities, and relatives . . . [typically 
consisting] of Him (he’s The Boss, after all), his spouse (who won’t ask 
embarrassing questions), and someone—most often an attorney/friend—
who writes up the minutes (of the meetings he never holds).”206  Jonovic 
surmises that independent directors should be added when the company is 
reasonably successful, when there is a stable management structure, and 
managers and advisors are competent.  Also, the boss has “gotta wanna” 
add independent directors.207  After a reasonable amount of time from the 
inception of the board, independent directors must come in.208  Waiting too 
long will act as a self-insulation device for the founder to do whatever he or 
 
 201. Id. 
 202. See Gerald Le Van, The Real Value of Outsiders on the Board, FAM. BUS. MAG., 
June 1990, at 1-2 (contending that independent directors can provide the CEO of a family 
business with the best advice on important decisions). 
 203. See generally Schwartz & Barnes, supra note 84, at 279-80 (examining the findings 
of a study of CEO attitudes towards inside and outside board members). 
 204. Id. at 284. 
 205. See DONALD JONOVIC, THE SECOND-GENERATION BOSS: A SUCCESSOR’S GUIDE TO 
BECOMING THE NEXT OWNER-MANAGER OF A SUCCESSFUL FAMILY BUSINESS 174 (1982) 
(providing multiple explanations for business owners’ preferences for family members on 
directorial boards). 
 206. Id. 
 207. See id. at 175-76 (contending that the effectiveness of a director depends on the 
owner’s willingness to consider and utilize the board’s recommendations) (emphasis 
omitted). 
 208. Id. 
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she pleases and to buy whatever he or she wants.209  Keeping outsiders off 
the board may just be a personal vanity of the founder at the expense of 
business survival.210  By the time the independent directors finally arrive, 
the place may already be a big mess. 
E. Contra-Indications to Independence 
There are some family companies that do not have an independent 
board211—in fact, they may not have a real board at all, but rather a 
fictitious or paper one just to satisfy the requirements of the IRS and 
protect the corporate shell.212  This plan is not beneficial for the business or 
the shareholders.  If the board of directors exists only on paper, or if the 
concept of a board is not taken seriously, a host of problems may surface 
later.  There are many reasons that family companies object to an 
independent board.  The founder-CEO may not want a real board because 
he or she may not want to share power, cultivate potential critics (no matter 
how constructive) to his or her leadership style and non-inclusiveness, train 
and educate board members, or have board interference.213  Years of having 
“paper boards” will also harden the resolve of this founder-CEO when he 
or she is placed in a situation, perhaps based on the rapid expansion of the 
company, where outside advice is necessary through a formal board.214  He 
or she may end up nominally appointing a board, but never treating the 
directors with the respect that they deserve as conscientious fiscalizers or 
fiscal managers.215  Even worse, he or she may not listen to them at all.216  
 
 209. See Davis, supra note 50, 1 (stating that most family company managers do not 
want an independent board because they want to be free from board interference when 
making decisions). 
 210. See Le Van, supra note 203, 1-2 (suggesting that an inside board may not really 
challenge the CEO of a family-run business). 
 211. See Davis, supra note 50, at 1 (discussing the circumstances that give rise to the 
need for family-owned companies to form an outside board; in contrast, an “inside board” is 
composed of only family members, close family friends, professional advisers with 
contractual relations with the company, and past or present employees); Schwartz & Barnes, 
supra note 84, at 272 (noting a survey of family-owned business CEOs that found that the 
majority of respondents had boards composed exclusively of insiders). 
 212. Davis, supra note 50, at 1. 
 213. See Murdock, supra note 163, 1-3 (discussing the distinction between a formal 
board and an advisory board). 
 214. Alexander, supra note 39. 
 215. Id. 
 216. See Clarke, supra note 12, at 2 (recommending that directors develop a thorough 
understanding of the family owners’ values, goals and plans to avoid being ignored by the 
owners).  Board members must determinedly persist without being obnoxiously offensive, 
and must have, not an ounce of patience, but an entire army of patience and stamina.  Id.  
This patience is what Clarke calls Patience Quotient (PQ) which is definitely much longer 
than in publicly traded companies.  Id. 
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If a corporation has been run solely, yet successfully, by the founder-
entrepreneur for the last twenty or so years, the sudden formation of a 
board of directors may make him or her cringe at the prospect of power 
divestiture, leading to a board in form but not in substance.217  By the time 
the founder finally creates an independent board, he or she most likely has 
already morphed into a recalcitrant, unbending, and uncompromising 
tyrant,218 whom Sonnenfeld describes as a “[m]onarch.”219  Such tyrants, 
unappreciative of board independence, do not know how to “[pull] back 
from involvement,” or “[assess] with detachment,” or even “[learn] not to 
be.”220 
If a formal board is constituted, but only sporadically and 
discretionarily listened to by the founder, or coerced to agree to pre-
ordained executive decisions, then the directors become ineffectual.221  It 
turns the governance institution into a mere rubberstamp,222 clearly at the 
beck and call of the founder.  If the independent directors allow themselves 
to be intimidated or dominated by the founder, then they metamorphose 
into empty, ceremonial figures—names that management can trumpet as 
independent voices that are actually muffled, stifled mutes. 
Another contra-indication to independence would be secret, non-board 
 
 217. Murdock, supra note 163, at 1-2. 
 218. See Le Van, supra note 203, at 1-2 (using a hypothetical CEO of a family-owned 
business to demonstrate the advantages of having outsiders as board members).  Long-
serving founder-CEOs often confuse themselves with their business legacies.  Id.  They are 
often unyielding and do not appreciate being challenged.  Id.  In reality, no one dares 
challenge him or her, not his or her son, lawyer, and certainly not his or her accountant.  Id.  
His or her consultants do all his or her biddings.  Id.  No one would want to push him or her 
back.  Id.  This makes him or her a tyrant.  Id. 
 219. JEFFREY SONNENFELD, The Hero’s Reluctant Farewell, in THE HERO’S FAREWELL: 
WHAT HAPPENS WHEN CEOS RETIRE 58, 70-71 (Oxford Univ. Press 1998).  According to 
Sonnenfeld, as one of the CEO’s departure styles, “[m]onarchs do not leave office until they 
are decisively forced out through the death of the chief executive or through an internal 
palace revolt.  This palace revolt may be in the form of ultimatums, the resignations of top 
officers, or the action of the board of directors.”  Id. at 70.  Other departure styles include 
that of the “general” who leaves office marked by a similar coercive exit; he “plots his 
return and quickly comes back to office” since he believes that he needs to save it from the 
hands of the incompetent successor.  Id.  Another style is the “ambassador,” which is the 
Stewardship practicing type.  Id. at 70-71.  Ambassadors peacefully and timely leave office, 
serve as mentors to the next-in-line CEO, and may remain on the board but are not out to 
“sabotage the successor.”  Id. at 71.  Lastly, “governors rule for a limited term” and abruptly 
shift to other outlets of leadership, but seldom return to help or maintain contact with the 
firm.  Id.  Governors can be compared to CEOs who serve for two to four years after getting 
the boot or resigning, they totally cut off any connection with the firm (of course after 
getting a hefty golden parachute and related emoluments).  Id. 
 220. Renato Tagiuri, Life Stages and Their Tasks, Harv. Univ. VII8-10, at 1-2. 
 221. See DYER, supra note 4, 67 (claiming that the role and function of the board must be 
established). 
 222. Id. 
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decisions made by key family members that are subsequently attempted to 
be rammed down the throats of the board.223  An accepted reality in the 
family business situation is that key family members may want to retain 
control even if they are not part of management or are not board 
members.224  In collusion with the person in charge, whether it be the 
founder, CEO, or an older generation’s former leader, some important 
family members may devise plans or make decisions behind the back of the 
duly constituted board and then try to run these decisions through the 
board.225  Independent boards must immediately see these things from afar 
and prevent them from being passed on as board decisions.226  Undermining 
legally constituted boards may be a way to retain or attain power by family 
members who were either bypassed or are in a current family struggle.227  
Boards must not fall prey to these schemes, as they contradict the very 
foundation of what independence is all about. 
IV. ADVANTAGES OF A MAJORITY OF INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS 
As stated earlier, founder-CEOs tend to be very subjective and fail to 
look at themselves properly in the mirror.228  They tend to believe that what 
they are doing is always, or almost always, right.229  There is usually 
nobody there to constructively criticize them, and no one from the officer’s 
group is willing to stick his or her neck out to challenge the legitimacy or 
viability of the decision of “the grand old man.”230  If the founder-CEO 
thinks a large competitor should be bought, this deal will most likely push 
through, barring any antitrust issues.231  If he or she perceives it a proper 
time to invest in domestic or foreign companies, be they related and 
strategic or otherwise, then most likely no one will be able to pull him or 
her back.232 
 
 223. See generally Davis, supra note 73, at 1 (discussing the implications of an 
agreement between brothers in a partnership that, when enacted by a newly formed board, 
threatened to destroy the partnership). 
 224. Id. 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. 
 228. See Le Van, supra note 203, at 1-2 (arguing that even successful CEOs of family 
businesses need help from advisors in making big, risky decisions). 
 229. Id. 
 230. Id.  See Hamilton Nolan, The Old Men of Media Moguldom, THE HUFFINGTON 
POST, July 8, 2008, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/07/08/the-old-men-of-media-
mogu_n_111496.html (affirming elderly CEOs’ desire to work until they die and the 
inability of younger counterparts to intervene). 
 231. Roberts, supra note 17, at 3-4. 
 232. Id.  See John Cook, Murdoch Buys Brooklyn Paper, GAWKER, Mar. 10, 2009, 
http://gawker.com/5167657/murdoch-buys-brooklyn-paper (questioning Murdoch’s decision 
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Hence, the adoption of active, strong, well-informed, and independent 
boards can easily be justified by the founder-CEO’s inability to know either 
the company’s limits or his or her personal limits.233  Independent boards 
are well suited to rein in the founder-CEO at the precise moment, and to 
provide timely and sagely advice when the CEO is out of control or 
excessively reckless.234  Insider directors, usually family members, will 
generally not have the temerity to clarify, much less duel, with the founder-
CEO.235  They will typically submit to the founder-CEO’s wishes to the 
detriment of the family business and its shareholders, either because of 
family culture, their own narrow self-interest, or passivity.236  In certain 
situations, the contrary is true:  a younger brother, daughter, or son may be 
continuously fighting with “the grand old man,” chastising him for the 
littlest or most trivial things, and imputing malice to every move.237  
Independent boards may be able to bridge the widening gap between 
shareholder interests and the egocentricity of the founder-CEO, and 
perhaps even the gap between “the grand old man” and his rival kin.238  
According to Fischer and Stevenson, independent boards lead to “increased 
professionalism and accountability; greater credibility with the company’s 
various stakeholders; a clearer sense of corporate mission and strategy; 
access to top-quality advice at a fraction of the cost of consulting firms; and 
broader perspective on top-level policy decisions.”239 
Considering the many advantages of independent boards, the selection 
of independent directors is critical.  Family friends, next-of-kin, sailing 
buddies, or childhood best friends should simply not make the cut; neither 
should retired company managers, individuals who serve on a very large 
number of boards, and even professional consultants who have conflicting 
interests.240  There are many important criteria to consider in selecting an 
independent director in a family business.241  The following represents a 
partial list: 
 
to buy Brooklyn Paper). 
 233. See Le Van, supra note 203, 1-2 (noting the value and desirability of boards 
composed of experienced outside directors). 
 234. Id. 
 235. Id.  On the other extreme, they may be dueling all the time, which also demonstrates 
the need for independent boards.  See Davis, supra note 73, at 1 (noting that a board can 
serve to comfort a family CEO who is constantly criticized by his family). 
 236. See Roberts, supra note 17, at 3-4 (discussing the history of the business founded by 
Sam Steinberg). 
 237. See Raymond, supra note 79, at 1-7 (recounting a retired family CEO’s struggles 
with his unyielding and demanding father, when the father was president and the son was a 
sales manager). 
 238. Id. 
 239. Fischer & Stevenson, supra note 102, at 9-10. 
 240. NEUBAUER & LANK, supra note 169, at 115-16. 
 241. Le Van, supra note 203, at 1-2. 
OSIFINAL_SIX 1/22/2010  5:14:57 PM 
2009] FAMILY BUSINESS GOVERNANCE 217 
 
1.Need for integrity, honesty, commitment, professionalism, and 
a strong sense of service;242 
2.Not conflicted in that he or she has no prior or present business 
ties with the company, and is not related by blood by a 
reasonable number of degrees;243 
3.Has run or is running a successful family-run or publicly-held 
business (to add quality to the board and to the corporation as a 
whole);244 
4.Does not need to have absolute expertise in the industry or 
know the day-to-day operations of the company (in fact, the 
independent director ideally should not have operational 
knowledge or expertise in the same industry where the business 
operates);245 
5.Possession of a clear understanding of people, their basic 
psychology, the concept of familiar relations and interactions, 
and general working relationships (with emphasis on the 
idiosyncrasies of the founder-CEO);246 
6.Open to understanding the basic history of the company, 
transition problems in the past, and the interplay between the 
founder and his children;247 
7.Embodiment of stewardship, particularly in succession 
issues;248 
8.An empowering attitude and outlook—particularly for 
leadership succession and life in general;249 
9.A congenial, mentoring persona;250 
10.The right skills and expertise, such as “core technologies, 
research and development, marketing, and finance,” 251 
depending on the company’s current state of business252—
 
 242. Id. 
 243. Id. 
 244. Id. 
 245. See Stone, supra note 101, at 2 (discussing how the CEO of a family business used 
his experiences on the board of a different company to develop general criteria for choosing 
individuals to serve on the board of his own company). 
 246. Alexander, supra note 39. 
 247. See Le Van, supra note 203, at 1-2 (arguing that insiders, such as the founder’s 
children, should not sit on the board, but should attend board meetings in an educational 
capacity). 
 248. Sydney Finkelstein & Eric M. Jackson, An Early-warning System to Guard Against 
Failure, FAM. BUS. MAG., Winter 2007, at 2-3; Robert C. Elliott, A Process for Managing 
Wealth and Well-being, FAM. BUS. MAG., Winter 2008, at 1-3. 
 249. James H. Biteman, Franklin Harris & Sons, Inc., Harv. Bus. Sch. Note 9-377-019, 
1976, at 1. 
 250. See Fischer & Stevenson, supra note 102, at 5 (asserting that directors of family 
businesses should be willing to mentor the owner’s children to minimize intergenerational 
tensions). 
 251. Davis, supra note 50, at 2. 
 252. Fischer & Stevenson, supra note 102, at 3-4.  For example, when the company is in 
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essentially, boards should have the right mix of directors;253 
11.Emotional Intelligence (EQ);254 
12.Leadership, crisis experience,255 sensitivity to family and 
business conflicts, ability to actively listen, and the resolve to act 
as mediator or counselor if the situation calls for it;256 
13.Sufficient chemistry with the founder-CEO and other board 
members;257 
14.Willingness to undergo periodic or annual assessment and 
performance survey; and 
15.Willingness to follow a duly crafted board or company 
manual.258 
A. Deadlock Breakers, Mediators and Conflict Managers 
One of the risks that independent directors must expect is that there 
will be long histories of family bonding as well as conflicts, which they 
will never entirely know about.259  An outsider and a stranger to the internal 
workings of the family, he or she is propelled into a position that may 
appear very formal and amiable in the boardroom, but may actually be 
 
the process of going public, it will be useful for someone on the board with experience in 
that area.  Id.  The independent director need not be a securities lawyer or a former fund 
manager.  Id.  However, he or she needs to have a thorough understanding of the mechanics 
and requirements of going public to help the company successfully enter the world of 
publicly-held enterprise.  Id. 
 253. Id.  More important than the size of the board is its mix of talents, experience, and 
personalities.  Id.  To be effective, a board must operate as a balanced system with healthy 
group dynamics.  Id.  Each individual’s personal and professional qualities must be aligned 
with the company’s strategic objectives.  Id.  The ideal directors are neither dominant nor 
reticent.  Id.  They are candid yet tactful and always mindful that the role of a director is to 
help the owner of the business realize his or her dreams.  Id. 
 254. Id.  They need to have a fine sense of boundaries that enables them to know when 
the board should get involved and when it should not.  Many issues that arise are close calls.  
Where to draw the line becomes especially problematic if there is no process like a family 
council to deal with issues arising in the business that affect the family.  This kind of 
boundary management is a question not only of when to get involved, but also of when to 
exert influence.  Id. 
 255. See Cohn, supra note 136, at 2 (arguing that board members must be able to 
competently minimize the negative impact of unexpected problems). 
 256. See Davis, supra note 50, at 2 (stating “board members have to know when to push 
and when to back off; they must be skilled at depersonalizing discussion of sensitive 
issues.”); see also Edwin A. Hoover & Colette Lombard Hoover, Ethical Dilemmas of 
Right-vs.-Right, FAM. BUS. MAG., Autumn 1997, at 4-7 (discussing foundational principles 
that can help a mediator resolve generational disputes in a family business situation). 
 257. Davis, supra note 50, at 2.  For Davis, this is a “make-or-break criteria.”  Id. 
 258. Jayne A. Pearl, Dealing with Dissent, FAM. BUS. MAG., Winter 2007, at 7. 
 259. See Edwin T. Crego Jr., When to Get Involved in a Family Conflict, FAM. BUS. 
MAG., Mar. 1990, at 1-3 (stating that there are both conflicts that only the immediate family 
is aware about  and ones in which outside mediation is sought to help resolve the issue). 
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running berserk due to long-standing family disagreements.260  Even before 
the independent director accepts the task, he or she must ask himself or 
herself whether he or she has the patience, the stamina, the skills, and the 
fortitude to do well as an outsider.261  The independent director may be 
accused of bias along the way, may get sued in the process, and may be 
unsavorily dismissed as inept.262 
One drawback of being an independent director is that one may be 
perceived as too independent from the wishes of the family.  His or her 
actions may be interpreted as a revolt against the family.263  For example, in 
one family business board comprised of seven directors (four independents, 
two insider-family members, and an outsider CEO-director), the four 
independents voted to hire a headhunter to look for a worthy CEO 
successor; this action did not sit well with the two insider-family directors 
because they wanted one of their own to head the company.264  This 
“revolt” ended with a legal ploy consisting of the institution of a Family 
Business Council that mobilized thirty (30) or so family shareholders, the 
resignation of the four independent directors, and the election of one of the 
family members as CEO.265  Though some may perceive this as a blow to 
the notion of independent directors in family-run businesses, in fact it is 
not—the independent directors simply performed their role as emotionally 
detached, neutral, and objective board members.  As conflict managers, 
these four independent directors may have felt that resigning (because they 
stuck to their conviction that an outsider is a better successor) was the best 
way to resolve the conflict.  Even with this “revolt” scenario, the consultant 
who advised the family to set up the Family Business Council stated that it 
is important for family boards to include independents as “[t]hey can bring 
in fresh ideas and objectivity, and often can defuse potential conflict among 
family members.”266  Indeed, if the independent director is up to the 
challenge, he or she can provide perspective, neutrality, and objectivity that 
 
 260. See Peter Davis, Taming the Emotions that Upset Business, FAM. BUS. MAG., Dec. 
1990, at 1-4 (noting that personal family emotions can negatively affect a business). 
 261. See Leon Danco, Where to Find Top Talent for Your Dream Board, FAM. BUS. 
MAG., Winter 1996, at 1-4 (stating that many of the qualities needed for an independent 
board member of a family company can be found in board members of large public 
companies). 
 262. See Powell, supra note 30, at 1 (noting that an independent director may be sued by 
a disgruntled family member who is a shareholder in the family business). 
 263. See Kevin McManus, Whose Company is This Anyway?, FAM. BUS. MAG., Feb. 
1990, at 1-7 (noting that a statement by an outside director that Challenge Machinery Co. 
would no longer be a family company was a misstep because it was seen by the two family 
board members as “fighting words”). 
 264. Id. 
 265. Id. 
 266. Id. 
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the family sorely lacks.267 
One of the independent director’s roles, although it will not appear in 
any written formal responsibilities, is to act as a deadlock breaker.268  Often 
a situation arises where the patriarch-owner will not agree with the 
suggestions of his son or daughter (the successor-in-waiting), and it will be 
up to the independent directors to display magnanimity, professional 
maturity, and grace under pressure in order to quell a potential uprising.269  
Consider a situation where the patriarch-owner wants to fire a vice 
president whom the son or daughter considers a friend and a talented co-
worker.  It is up to the independent directors on the board to vote according 
to their conscience and break the impasse.  This responsibility is of course 
shared with insider directors as well.270  If the board decides to side with the 
father, it is the role of the independent directors to explain to the son or 
daughter, who just walked out of the room and threatened to resign, as to 
why they voted that way.271  Perhaps their vote is explainable by their 
intrinsic wisdom not to directly pit the father against the son or daughter.272  
Had they voted in favor of the son or daughter, there may have been 
tremendous, deleterious consequences, such as the father radically 
declaring the sale of the company.273  Whatever vote they cast, as deadlock 
breakers, independents must be able to soothe the relationship of the family 
leadership.274  They likewise ought to provide better perspective to founder-
owners who have created a “legend” status for themselves,275 which almost 
 
 267. Id.; see All You Need to Ask When Hiring a Consultant, FAM. BUS. MAG., Autumn 
1994, at 1-13 (noting that the independent director’s objective nature and neutrality should 
reflect, if not surpass, that of professional advisors and consultants specifically advising 
family-run businesses). 
 268. See Kelin E. Gersick, What's in April's Best Interest?, FAM. BUS. MAG., Spring 
1995, at 1-13 (noting that in a family business board composed of a divorced man, his 
former wife, and a third person, the third person-director was compelled to decide the fate of 
the business when the divorced man got an offer to sell the print business--a move that was 
very much objected to by his former wife); see also Ivan Lansberg, One for All and All for 
One, FAM. BUS. MAG., Autumn 1995, at 3 (commenting that in Europe, the mediator or 
deadlock breaker is known as a “nonfamily consiglieri who is given considerable authority 
to help manage rivalries and disagreements”). 
 269. See Clayton P. Alderfer, Understanding and Consulting to Family Business Boards, 
1 FAM. BUS. REV. 249, 252 (1988), available at 
http://fbr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/1/3/249 (discussing interpersonal and 
professional dynamics of family boards and role of independent directors within this 
context). 
 270. Id. 
 271. Id. at 252-53. 
 272. Id. at 253. 
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 275. Richard Salomon, Setting a Standard for Future Generations, FAM. BUS. MAG., 
Summer 2005, at 2. 
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always leads to the subjugated status of their next-in-line kin.276 
Independent directors can also act as mediators of family and business 
strife.  According to Taguiri, one way to break out of old, unproductive 
interaction patterns is to “[p]ut a buffer person between”277 the feuding 
family members.278  This could be the mother, a distant aunt, a grandfather-
cum-founder, or even a long-serving non-family executive.279  As trust 
catalysts, these individuals may be able to allay dissidence and foster 
harmony in the family and in the business.280  Other than these insiders or 
family members, independent directors may themselves be mediators.  
They need not be playing the mediating director role only during the 
quarterly board meetings; they can also easily do so when the father or the 
son calls upon them for private suggestions or revelation of confidences.281  
They must rationally explain to whoever is seeking their guidance that 
people must generally “[a]ccept some differences in [each other’s] 
objectives.”282  Independents must also realize that they cannot “expect two 
highly rivalrous personalities to work well together”283 and should bear this 
in mind when trying to understand the differences between them284 in the 
hopes of seeking resolution.  On a wider scale, the board as a whole must 
be a reliable mediator.285  Ward postulates that a board of directors is a 
“mediating mechanism”286 that will be useful in conflict resolution. 
B. Forestalling Oppression and the Excesses of the Controlling 
Shareholder 
There is a saying that tyranny breeds tyranny.  It has been said that 
“the atrocities of the demagogues and the re-establishment of successive 
tyrannies in France can be explained in terms of the moral and intellectual 
depravity of the populace prior to the Revolution, a depravity caused, 
again, by centuries of misrule and superstition.”287  In other words, a tyrant 
 
 276. Id. 
 277. Tagiuri, supra note 221, at 1. 
 278. Id. 
 279. See Lansberg, supra note 87, at 2 (noting the need for the independent director to be 
involved in the selection process of a successor to ease family tensions). 
 280. Id. 
 281. Heidrick, supra note 197, at 271. 
 282. Id. 
 283. Id. 
 284. See David Keirsey, Different Drummers, in PLEASE UNDERSTAND ME II 1, 1-3 
(1998) (examining how people are fundamentally different in ways that are not easily 
changed). 
 285. See WARD, supra note 15, at 157 (analyzing the challenges of maintaining the long-
term health of a family-run business). 
 286. Id. 
 287. CIAN DUFFY, SHELLY AND THE REVOLUTIONARY SUBLIME 130 (2005). 
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who has been ruling a certain country or fiefdom risks, with his life and 
limbs, that, upon his overthrow, he shall be strung up the way Mussolini 
was summarily executed and his body hung upside down in Milan for 
public viewing; or the way Romania’s erstwhile dictator Nicolae Ceausescu 
was overthrown and executed after a two-hour kangaroo trial during the 
bloody Romanian Revolution of 1989. 
As applied to the tyranny of a family founder such as Sumner 
Redstone,288 he of course will not suffer exactly the same physical fate as 
past political tyrants; however, he may suffer something similar.  If he 
oppresses and dominates a sibling, a son, or a daughter too excessively 
during the length of his leadership, the successor may implement the same 
or comparable viciousness when the founder is finally led out of the 
boardroom.  This could translate to the possible abrogation of his long-term 
policies, a drastic change of corporate vision, selling off profitable 
subsidiaries, firing of his pet people, discontinuation of favorite products 
and services, and the like.  It may well be said that he is at least 
metaphorically being hanged upside down.  If the successor does not take 
revenge on the founder’s legacy, he may do so on the employees and senior 
managers, and the cycle of tyranny continues.  Ward has stated that 
“[m]any successors . . . rebel against past business practices instead of 
trying to understand them . . . [and] eagerly propose new systems, seeking 
to introduce changes that reflect their own identity.”289 
It is better that oppression by a past generation does not carry over to 
oppression by the current and future generation.  But corporate excesses, 
misjudgments, and mishandlings are quite common in family-run 
enterprises,290 especially since the founder thinks he can do absolutely 
anything, as it is his business.291  Sumner Redstone, at eighty-four years old 
and still the chairman and controlling shareholder of Viacom, Inc., has 
allegedly been trying to force his daughter, Shari off the Viacom board.292  
This comes after Shari and Sumner united to force Sumner’s son, Brent off 
the board of the family’s privately-held movie theater chain, National 
Amusements.293  Brent Redstone has since sued his father and National 
 
 288. See infra note 297 (discussing the Redstone family dispute). 
 289. WARD, supra note 15, at 199. 
 290. See MILLER & BRETON-MILLER, supra note 3, at 12 (summarizing related research 
by scholars relating to mismanagement in family businesses). 
 291. Louis B. Barnes, Precista Tools AG (A), HARV. BUS. SCH. Note 9-488-046, 1989, at 
3-4. 
 292. Sarah Gilbert, Heir Apparent: Shari and 'Daddy Dearest' Sumner Redstone, 
BLOGGINGSTOCKS, Mar. 21, 2008, http://www.bloggingstocks.com/2008/03/21/heir-
apparent-shari-and-daddy-dearest-sumner-redstone/. 
 293. Peter Cohan, Will Irascible Old Monster Sumner Redstone Sell Viacom?, 
BLOGGINGSTOCKS, July 19, 2007, http://www.bloggingstocks.com/2007/07/19/will-
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Amusements, seeking the dissolution of Viacom and CBS.294  Brent also 
accused Sumner Redstone, the legendary founder, of favoring his sister and 
excluding him in important business decisions.295  This family squabble has 
since been resolved, at least for the time being.296  When Sumner Redstone 
leaves office, either voluntarily, removed by board pressure (such as 
Michael Eisner’s resignation from Disney some years back after a lengthy 
litigation and extreme pressure),297 or escorted by an undertaker, it is 
unknown what Shari and Brent will do.  If Shari or Brent is chosen to 
succeed him, will he or she sell bits and pieces of the company for 
immediate liquidity?  Will he or she share or forsake their father’s vision?  
Will he or she sell Viacom, Inc. after it has achieved so much?  Will they 
retaliate against the iron-hand hegemony of their father, and if so, to what 
extent? 
These questions seem to have no answers at present.  It may very well 
be that, upon his exit, Sumner’s heirs/successors will lead the company in a 
fair, democratic, ethical, and stewardly manner.  But it is too early to tell, 
as “the grand old man” appears to have some years left.298  What is 
interesting is what the Viacom board is doing (or not doing).  Conceptually, 
the board should be able to curtail such excesses from the founding parent, 
as well as temper the probable retaliation or vindictiveness by the successor 
once he or she assumes the top post.  Of the eleven members of the Viacom 
board, four certainly are insiders, while seven appear to be independent 
directors.299  What can they concretely do to ensure that there is adequate 
succession planning, a smooth transition period, and that oppression and 
tyranny are avoided?  This is an independent board, is it not?  The 
independent directors are bound, particularly under Viacom’s Corporate 
Governance Guidelines (revised December 2007) to “make independent, 
analytical inquiries . . .  [and] should exhibit practical wisdom and mature 
judgment . . . . A majority of Viacom’s directors will meet the criteria for 
 
 294. CNNMoney.com Staff, Redstone's Son Sues Family-Run Firm, CNNMONEY.COM, 
Feb. 15, 2006, http://money.cnn.com/2006/02/15/ news/newsmakers/redstone/. 
 295. Jenn Abelson, The Redstone Saga: Falling Out Puts Future of Cinema Chains Run 
From Dedham in Doubt, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 1, 2007, available at 
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 296. Greg Griffin, Redstones Settle Feud Over Family Business, DENVERPOST.COM, Feb. 
6, 2007, available at http://www.denverpost.com/search/ci_5164430. 
 297. The Associated Press, Eisner Resigns from Disney Board of Directors, 
USATODAY.COM, Oct. 6, 2005, available at http://www.usatoday.com/money/media/2005-
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independence established by the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) 
corporate governance listing standards.”300  But are these independent 
directors too powerless to do anything against the bull-strong founder?301  
Though any prognosis now may seem specious at best, the Viacom board, 
despite its independence, is not a good model of family business 
governance.  The board has certainly achieved many important things in 
other areas, but it has failed to keep in check the excesses of the majority 
shareholder.  It is not serving its role as corporate conscience and acts like a 
highly enfeebled governance mechanism that is powerless instead of 
empowering. 
This only goes to show that having independent directors on family 
boards does not ipso facto solve all problems.  If they do not perform their 
fiduciary duties and responsibilities well, then their independence is subject 
to question.  Despite the advantages of more independent directors on a 
board, it must also be remembered that such a prescription is not 
automatically applicable or suitable to all businesses run by families.  It has 
been noted that “family business managers and consultants should realize 
that increasing . . . the proportion of unaffiliated outsiders [on the board] 
will not lead to improved performance under all conditions.  It is important 
to reflect on the contingent situation created by various aspects of family 
involvement in the business.”302  As far as Viacom’s board is concerned, 
due to the company’s sheer size and complexity, it is appropriate for it to 
have a majority of independent directors.  That said, however, the 
independent directors ought to continuously and meticulously balance and 
effectively advise “the grand old man,” Sumner Redstone. 
 
 300. Viacom, Inc., Corporate Governance Guidelines, 
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dominated chaebols.”  Id. 
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C. The Model Independent Board: The Clemens Family Corporation 
While the Viacom board may not be an ideal independent body, the 
independent board of directors of the Clemens Family Corporation is.  The 
Clemens board, more famous for its subsidiary, Hatfield Quality Meats, 
presently has a blend of outside and inside directors,303 with three insiders 
and four independent directors.  Of the three insiders, one is the CEO (Phil 
Clemens), while the other two are family members who are not employed 
by the company.304  Currently brimming with stewardship, the Clemens 
Family Corporation and its board were not always pretty pictures to 
observe. 
In 1999, the board (then known as the board of Hatfield Quality 
Meats, as the holding company Clemens Family Corporation was still to be 
formed) was puzzled as to why the company was in a downward financial 
spiral.305  Even their contributions to charity were going down.306  After 
consulting with the board, Phil Clemens spearheaded a rapid, behind-
closed-doors corporate upheaval that revitalized the entire company, but 
also bred familial discord, albeit temporarily.307  With the help of a strategic 
consultant, it was decided that a succession planning committee should 
immediately be formed and given plenary powers.308  After three months of 
deliberations, the resolutions of the committee were astounding and radical:  
long-entrenched family directors and employees were asked not to return to 
the company.309  The board, which was originally composed of ten family 
representatives and two independents, was disbanded.310  It was also 
decided that two family middle managers needed to gain outside 
experience.  The board of directors was heavily reconstituted with four old 
family directors asked not to return; two thirty-five year family employees 
were dismissed; a parent company known as Clemens Family Corporation 
was created; and an Owners’ Advisory Council was established.311  Phil 
Clemens, due to his competence and vision, was promoted to CEO and 
Chairman of the Clemens Family Corporation.312  The blitzkrieg-like 
change was unprecedented and caused a lot of suspicion, as well as a sense 
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of betrayal and jealousy.313  The board and management were later 
successful in allaying fears through the proper timing of the release of 
information, open communications with employees, and a spirited 
education campaign.314 
A company with a very humble foundation and deeply rooted in 
values,315 the Clemens Family Corporation did not always have an 
independent board.316  As of 1973, there was a majority of family members 
as directors with just a handful of outsiders.317  These outsiders were 
listened to at first, but their ideas were not implemented simply because of 
a prevailing attitude that the “family members know better.”318  This 
continued until the board was, as stated, completely revamped in 2000 by 
including independent directors, purging the old timers, and selecting 
family members who did not have managerial responsibilities, except for 
the CEO.319  Part of the strategy was to create an Owners’ Advisory 
Council whose main objective, other than to set owners’ expectations, was 
to interview and recommend candidates for the Clemens board.320  The 
board meets five times per year, has four standing committees, and is 
subjected to annual review.321 
In an interview with Phil Clemens, he stated that the typical family 
business board in the United States is composed of all insiders.322  This is 
due to the fact that the founder-owner and the board believe they already 
know everything about the business, which is simply incorrect.323  He 
pointed out that independent directors have a variety of tasks that cannot be 
done by the very subjective founders or family members, such as serving as 
balancers on the board, and interviewing for and selecting the next CEO.324  
If family member-directors will pick the next CEO, they will certainly pick 
their own son or in-law with little or no regard to their level of 
competency.325  He also mentioned that it would be best to try to avoid 
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directors whose independence might be questionable (e.g., suppliers and 
customers).326 
Additionally, he recommended that generally (and depending on the 
size of the board in question) family boards should at least have three 
independent directors for balance.327  Independent directors are identified 
and recruited through word-of-mouth, but the assistance of search firms 
and the Family Firm Institute (FFI) is most laudable.328  What should be 
guarded against, he noted, is whether the independent director really 
exercised his independence and objectivity on vital board decisions.329  Did 
he exercise his own judgment?  Was it a credible independent decision, or 
was he forced by the family to vote that way?  Coercion and deception 
should be avoided at all times.330  Directors also must not serve too long, as 
they will easily become attached to personnel, become friends with the 
CEO, and thus lose their independence.331  He asks:  how can you vote 
against the CEO when he has already become your friend and colleague?  
Phil Clemens thus suggested that the minimum time to serve should be 
three years (electable every year) and the maximum ought to be ten.332  
This time period will leave a comfortable average of around seven years of 
board service.333 
Based on his own experience, independent directors who become 
close friends with the CEO should resign.334  Phil Clemens resigned from 
boards he served on in New Jersey and Florida simply because he could not 
perform his role as monitor and conscience when he had become good 
friends with the person he was supposed to oversee.  He simply told these 
boards he had to resign.335  For him, independent directors are fresh eyes, 
eager individuals who see the bigger picture of the company and prescribe 
workable solutions.336  Though independents may sometimes be viewed 
with antagonism, management generally appreciates outside board 
members because they know outsiders are going to be fair, as they do not 
have ties with the business.337  It is also best, he mentioned, that 
independent directors do not come from the same industry as the 
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corporation’s industry.338  He himself is a director in a successful flower 
company and his thoughts and opinions are most valued.339  He similarly 
postulated that it is hard for independent directors—in fact very dangerous-
-—to meddle into family problems and squabbles.340  “That simply isn’t 
their duty.”341 
There are times when independent directors can play mediating roles, 
but the maintenance of family unity is not one of their chief functions.342  
On the charge that independent directors do not know the business they are 
asked to monitor, Clemens stated that independents are not tasked to know 
every corner of the business.343  The nature of the job of an independent 
director is to select the next CEO, provide insight from the outside, oversee 
management, give a different yet fresh perspective, and present the bigger 
picture objectively.344  It is not the nature of their job to interfere with the 
day-to-day affairs or to know everything there is to know about the 
company.345  His company’s criteria for independent directors are:  (1) 
currently a senior management individual from a successful business, with 
preference for Presidents or CEOs; (2) strong financial background and 
clearly understands the need and value of business metrics; (3) 
unquestionable ethics and integrity; (4) embraces the visions, values, and 
culture of the Clemens Family Corporation; and (5) proposed directors 
shall not have a conflict of interest with any Clemens Family Corporation 
business.346 
V. THE IDEAL FAMILY BUSINESS BOARD:  BOARD SIZE, FREQUENCY OF 
MEETINGS, AGENDA, PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING 
It is difficult to pin down a perfect board size for most family-run 
businesses.  Several factors have to be considered.  These factors would 
include the size of the organization, the length of time it has been in 
business, and its annual returns.  A family company should typically have 
five to eight directors347 (or seven to twelve directors for larger entities), 
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with a majority of independent directors.  Insider directors should consist 
of the CEO and a few family representatives who need not be employed in 
the company or even be direct family members.  They can be 
representatives elected by the shareholders, the family, or the family 
council.348  In the long-run, due to possible tensions or conflicts of interest, 
it may be better to avoid appointing as directors family members who are 
going up in the corporate ladder.  If an employed family member is already 
a very senior manager and is seen as a potential successor, then it may be a 
good idea to give that individual a directorial role so that the board can 
assess his or her viability and leadership. 
In terms of frequency of meeting, it will again depend on many 
factors.  As seen in the case of Vietri, Inc., its board had been meeting only 
once per year,349 yet communication between the owner-managers and 
board members was constant and open throughout the year.350  The Vietri 
board assisted greatly with issues ranging from transition and succession, to 
sibling rivalry.351  On the average, a family board should meet between four 
to six times per year, with the agenda set up by the CEO in consultation 
with the independent directors.352  More importantly, each meeting should 
be “a virtual seminar in business administration and human dynamics, with 
everyone present both teacher and student.”353 
The independent directors, as stated above, should outnumber the 
insiders and the grey directors.  As is the case of the Clemens Family 
Corporation, of the seven board members, only three are insiders (the CEO 
Philip Clemens and two other non-executive family members), and four are 
totally independent board directors.354  The ratio between insiders/grey and 
independent directors need not reach the present dynamics of publicly-held 
corporations, which stands at one to nine, with one insider director (the 
CEO) and all the rest independents.355  A good 70:30 or 60:40 ratio of 
independent directors to insider/grey directors would be a healthy 
composition of a present-day family board.356  As much as possible, 
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however, grey directors—meaning the corporation’s service providers (e.g. 
lawyers, accountants, bankers), CEO friends, business dealers and 
suppliers, and other friends of family members (e.g. golf buddies of an 
uncle in the business) —should be avoided.357  They are usually beholden 
to the family or dominated by the CEO or a kin very close to him, and 
therefore lack independence.358  They may eventually end up diminishing 
the integrity of the board. 
The family business board ought to schedule yearly planning meetings 
or retreats.359  Business Planning, it must be recalled, is a very inclusive 
activity.360  Thus, the business of the board need not be confined to formal 
meetings or telephone conversations.  Camaraderie, interpersonal 
communication, friendliness, candor, and familiness must permeate the 
board in all of its activities.  One of the better ways to achieve this is an 
annual retreat which will discuss and program future plans.361  This will 
help the board relax and get to know each other better, over and beyond 
their impressions of each other in the boardroom.362  This can be done 
every six months if time permits.363  According to John A. Davis and Keely 
Cormier, family business boards should meet quarterly for a day or more 
each time.364  Three of the four annual meetings should last one day, while 
the fourth should be a live-in retreat between the management and board to 
plan the following year’s programs.365 
Board members should also have limits on their terms of office.  
Directors should have a one to three year term limit, with reelection 
permissible, and should be compensated based on prevailing market 
norms.366  Neubauer and Lank advocate the suggestion by John Ward, who 
stated that companies should pay directors per day for board services in a 
manner similar to the “daily wage” of the owner-CEO (owner-CEO’s 
yearly pay divided by 250 working days).367  The compensation to directors 
should not be extravagant, but reasonable enough to incentivize attendance, 
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and must include retainer, board, committee fees, and perquisites, if any.368  
Also, a nominating committee ought to be responsible for screening and 
selecting potential directorial candidates,369 with assistance from human 
resources consultants or search firms.370  John A. Davis recommends that 
family shareholders should not only understand board member 
qualifications, but must likewise “participate, when useful, in the screening 
of board members.”371  Board directors should not spread themselves too 
thin by serving as directors in more boards than they can possibly handle 
both physically and mentally.372  This practice is frowned upon by the 
public and the business community.373  Directors should ideally serve on, at 
most, three to four boards, the ceiling of which can be adjusted depending 
on the director’s expertise, time availability, and lack of conflicting 
interests, among other factors.374 
Self-evaluation375 by the board should be part of its programming.376  
Who is performing well, who is absent for no justifiable reason, and who is 
not performing up to par are questions that must be answered and 
addressed by the board if it is to be an effective governance structure.377  
This will ensure that it is not made into a rubberstamp by the founder or 
CEO.378  It will also check the egos of the board members as they may 
think they are superbly performing when, in fact, they are not. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The concept of a family-run business is eternal and will not wither 
away.  Families will be starting new entrepreneurships or continuing 
businesses that have been handed down to them from the prior generations.  
As such, it is good to continually explore its strengths and identify its 
problem areas so that updated and relevant solutions are made.  Family 
businesses are very important in the economic fabric of any country.  One 
need not look too far:  a third of Fortune 500 firms are owned by 
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families;379 family-controlled businesses account for over half of U.S. 
employment and approximately 78% of new jobs created.380  Additionally, 
80-90% of all businesses in North America are family-run enterprises 
averaging fifty or so employees, and quite keenly, 39% of family-owned 
businesses will change leadership in the next five years.381  Asian 
businesses are predominantly family-owned enterprises, while in the 
European Union, family firms comprise about 60-90% of all businesses, 
depending on the country.382 
To ensure that family-run businesses go past the first and second 
generations, one of the key governance mechanisms is the institution of an 
independent board.  Consultants have argued that boards of directors must 
not be the first line of attack and are advocating for an advisory board that 
will eventually morph into a formal board of directors.383  There is truth and 
pragmatism to this argument, but if the company is ready for a board and 
the founder-CEO is enlightened that a well-chosen board is a “fountain of 
knowledge,”384 then its constitution need not be delayed by years or 
decades. 
The foundation of an independent board is independent directors.385  
Independent directors promote cohesion, provide perspective and 
neutrality, and check and balance the founder-CEO.  They serve to aid the 
board in its decisions due to their expertise and years of serving as 
corporate managers or CEOs.  They can also act as mediators in case there 
is a family conflict that is teetering on destroying the business, which they, 
as a corporate conscience, cannot simply sit by idly while the founder, the 
heir-apparent, and the family tear each other apart.  Failure to decisively act 
may lead to a violation of their fiduciary duties as directors, which means 
that serving on the board is not risk-free but risk-laden.  Hence, a strong 
commitment to serve, mental fortitude, and educated evenhandedness are 
critical. 
It is true that “family and business cultures, which shape governance 
systems, differ widely across geographical boundaries, as well as over time 
and business life-cycle stages.”386  Essentially, this means that family 
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business governance varies from place to place and from time to time.  This 
also means that independent boards are relevant based on existing 
circumstances of the family business.  Though outside boards are not 
mandatory for the survival and functioning of all family businesses in all 
relevant stages of their life cycles, having one will increase the chances of 
surviving well beyond the first and second generations. 
 
